Macalester College

DigitalCommons@Macalester College
Political Science Honors Projects

Political Science Department

Spring 4-25-2018

Nunca Más: Rhetoric of Human Rights and
Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Argentina
Sarah R. Coleman
Macalester College, scolema1@macalester.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors
Part of the Political Science Commons
Recommended Citation
Coleman, Sarah R., "Nunca Más: Rhetoric of Human Rights and Democracy in Post-Authoritarian Argentina" (2018). Political Science
Honors Projects. 74.
http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/poli_honors/74

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more
information, please contact scholarpub@macalester.edu.

Nunca Más: Rhetoric of Human Rights and Democracy in
Post-Authoritarian Argentina

Sarah Coleman
Advisor: Patrick Schmidt
Department of Political Science
Macalester College
April 25, 2018

Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Patrick Schmidt, for aiding
me throughout this process. His patience, support, and guidance was integral to the writing of
this thesis, and I cannot imagine having completed it without him.
Second, I would like to thank the members of my defense panel, Professor Wendy Weber
and Professor Nadya Nedelsky. I deeply appreciate the time they took to read my thesis and
provide insightful feedback that helped me create this final product.
I would also like to give my thanks to Professor Zornitsa Keremidchieva and Professor
Julie Dolan for being my academic advisors throughout my time at Macalester. I will always be
grateful for the time spent in their offices when I needed their support most.
Lastly, I express my gratitude to my friends and family who provided me with the moral
support I needed to take on and complete this project. Even when all I did was talk about the
overwhelming nature of writing a thesis, they were there to listen and encourage me.

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements

2

Introduction

4

Theoretical Foundations

9

Transitional Democracy

11

Transitional Justice

18

Rhetoric

25

Case Selection and Methodology

31

Country Case Selection

32

Document Selection

35

Method of Analysis

36

Rhetorical Analysis

38

Source Selection

38

United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights

38

Speeches from President Alfonsín

44

CONADEP’s Truth and Reconciliation Report

55

Menem, N. Kirchner, and C. F. Kirchner

61

Discussion and Conclusion

75

Bibliography

83

3

INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last quarter of the 20th century, and particularly in the 1990s, many parts
of the world were faced with how they were to conceptualize human rights. South Africa
abolished apartheid and officially acknowledged its damaging effects; Rwanda experienced a
horrific genocide of the Tutsi at the hands of the Hutu; the Bosnian War led to a period of ethnic
cleansing of Muslim Bosnians; Cambodia underwent a period of genocide carried out by the
Khmer Rouge regime; and nearly all of Latin America’s democratic regimes were toppled in
coup d’états that led to lengthy, repressive military dictatorships. Many regions and nations
across the globe witnessed people suffer unimaginable horrors at the hands of their governments
and their fellow citizens. Some of these conflicts found their roots in the ideological conflicts
that characterized the Cold War, while others had their origins in internal disputes and tensions
that were unrelated to any sort of superpower rivalry. Regardless of the source of these conflicts,
by the time they ended, the world was forced to pause and reevaluate what was meant by “human
rights”: What are human rights? What did it mean to protect human rights? What did it mean to
violate a human right? How did this violation or protection change the way members of society
viewed themselves and each other? How do we establish a respect for human rights that ensures
these horrors never reoccur?
Among these questions of human rights, there were also questions for those nations and
societies that were undergoing a change in regime as well. For many nations in Latin America,
authoritarianism and severe human rights violations were carried out by military governments
under the guise of protecting their countries from Marxist subversion. When these military
dictatorships had run their course and civilian rule had returned, these nations were faced with
another set of conundrums: What is democracy? What does it mean to operate democratically?
4

How does a nation establish democratic norms and faith in democratic governance in the wake of
a repressive regime? And most importantly, what responsibility does democracy have to
upholding human rights and achieving reconciliation after a period of conflict?
It is with these contemplations in mind that this thesis moves forward with two broader
questions: following a period of authoritarianism rife with human rights violations, how does a
transitional democracy establish norms upholding democracy and human rights? Moreover, what
are the long-term impacts and implications of this establishment of norms? I believe that these
questions are integral to understanding the way methods and goals of transition are framed
during a regime transition and beyond. The period of democratic transition is a delicate yet
highly influential one. It is a time for a nation to reevaluate itself and decide what it does and
does not want to embody; it is a point at which a nation can decide to break with or continue
certain historical patterns.
Specifically in the context of a democratic transition coinciding with a period of postconflict transitional justice,1 a period of political transition serves as a time in which a society
and a state can come together and discuss the ways human rights and democratic principles
should overlap going forward, and how that should be politically expressed. New definitions of
various concepts such as justice, truth, and reconciliation are formulated at this time, which are
used to guide the nation forward as it seeks to create a new democratic environment in which
human rights are protected in a certain way. Despite the clear importance of these ideological
reformulations, much of the current scholarly work on democratic transitions and transitional
justice predominantly focus on the role of institutions and institutional strength in establishing
certain norms (Munck 1989; Domínguez and Shifter 2008; Smith 2012; Levine and Molina
1

Which is often the case.
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2011; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1993; Levitsky and Murillo 2005). Similarly,
although transitional justice scholarship has done more to probe the importance of rhetoric, there
is still an overwhelming tendency to rely on the strength of democratic institutions 2 as the
primary explanatory variable for the choice of certain transitional justice mechanisms and their
subsequent success (MacAuliffe 2017; Mihai 2010; Sikkink and Walling 2007). The prevailing
assumption is that institutional strength determines the success or smoothness of a democratic
transition, and in turn the types of transitional justice mechanisms that will be utilized. In other
words, if democratic institutions are strong, the democratic transition will transpire rather easily,
and there will be more support for upholding democratic norms; similarly, if institutional
strength is high during the period of transition, more elaborate transitional justice mechanisms
will be utilized.
Reflective of much of current research in political science, the analysis of rhetoric as an
explanatory variable rather than a byproduct of other political forces has been left by the wayside
(Finlayson 2004). The research here proposes that the study of rhetorical and discursive patterns
has much to contribute to the discussion of transitional democracy, transitional justice, and the
ways they merge and interact. Focus on institutions alone implies that norms and political
consciousness are informed by institutional action in a unidirectional way, leaving no room for a
symbiotic perspective. In a similar vein, it does not answer the question of why certain
transitional justice mechanisms are not carried out everywhere once institutions attain a certain
level of strength. The way institutions operate and whether they are even defined as being strong
or weak in the first place is dependent on the pre-established democratic norms. This leaves us

2

It is crucial to note that throughout this essay, references to institutions refers to formal, structured, administrative
state organizations such as courts, legislatures, and bureaucracies. The use of the ter m institutions here does not refer
to ontological institutions such as the institution of human rights.
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with the question of how these norms are produced and reproduced. It is through rhetoric as a
method of analysis (tracing how democratic norms and principles are conceived of and
maintained over time, which I call rhetorical carbon dating) and as an explanatory variable
(rhetoric being the source of these norms and principles being developed) that a greater
understanding of the overlap between democracy and human rights can be achieved.
I argue that in the case of Argentina, rather than through institutional strength alone, it
was specific patterns of rhetoric that framed and contributed to the national understanding of
transitional justice, transitional democracy, and the norms surrounding them. Furthermore, as my
analysis shows, the rhetorical patterns established during the period of transition have had an
enduring legacy in the way Argentina understands the relationship between human rights and
democracy.
This thesis is divided into the following four sections: theory; methodology; rhetorical
analysis; and discussion and conclusion. In the chapter on theory, I present a literature review of
current theories related to transitional democracy, transitional justice, and rhetoric. I demonstrate
the gaps within current transitional justice and transitional democracy theory that can be filled by
what rhetorical theory has to offer. The following chapter lays out my methodology, such as the
decisions behind my case and document selections. I also go over my guidelines for how I
approach analyzing the rhetoric of each document, with much reference being made to Campbell
and Burkholder’s second edition of Critiques of Contemporary Rhetoric (1997). The next
chapter deals with the actual analysis of various documents, focusing the heart of my analysis on
speeches made by Argentina’s presidents from 1983 to 2015. Lastly, I conclude with a summary
of the implications and takeaways of my analysis, and what this thesis contributes to political
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science, specifically to the discussions on democracy and human rights. I also point to how
further research can build upon the relationships found here.

8

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Democratic transition and transitional justice are two processes that typically accompany
one another, as the prevalence of the word “transition” might suggest. In part because of this
association, the quality, implementation, and timeline of certain transitional justice practices is
often assumed to be dependent on the democratic transition. This is reflected within transitional
justice and democratic transition scholarship believes that the successful implementation of
transitional justice methods depends on the strength of democratic institutions (Dominguez and
Shifter 2008; O’Donnell 1994; Levine and Molina 2011). Much of the current scholarship
focuses heavily on how institutional strength is the ultimate determinant for whether a
transitional democracy will achieve consolidation or not, and similarly how transitional justice
mechanisms will play out. Furthermore, there is concern that certain transitional justice
mechanisms—namely truth commissions and domestic trials—may jeopardize the stability of the
fledgling democratic regime in addition to threatening eventual consolidation (Sikkink and
Walling 2007, 429). While institutional behavior is an important component of both areas, this
singular link is limiting; this becomes evident when looking at Argentina’s rhetorical use of
principles of democracy and human rights despite its historically weak institutions.
Transitional justice and transitional democracy are linked by more than institutional
processes; they are also deeply connected by the rhetoric that pervades them. While institutional
strength does have a significant role in the extent to which transitional states are able to
implement and further bureaucratize transitional justice mechanisms, it is the rhetoric
surrounding the overlap between democracy and human rights policy that has lasting impacts on
how the state and society will view the relationship between democracy and human rights going
forward. An overzealous focus on the role of institutions and state mechanisms is problematic in
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the sense that transitional justice and the very concept of human rights becomes bureaucratized
and limited by time, pre-established goals, and conceptions of justice regarding the way that it
can be carried out through official state action. MacAuliffe (2017) explains, the use of the term
“post-conflict” to describe the transitional democracy and transitional justice process reflects this
dilemma, since it implies “an uncomplicated trajectory from violent insecurity to pacific
stability...There are no fixed boundaries between conflict and post-conflict” (5). Taking this into
consideration, it is imperative to move beyond the focus on time constraining effects of
institutional development.
Conceptualizations of what human rights are, how they should be protected, the
connection they have to democracy, and how the state should be connected to them that
ultimately influence the way institutions behave and the way that they implement human rights
policy. While institutional capabilities may have some influence on the conceptualization of
human rights as policy in the immediacy of a democratic transition, it is the rhetoric of human
rights and its relation to democratic governance that will have long term influence in
conceptualizing the relationship between democracy and human rights.
The role of institutions should not be discredited. States are very much judged on how they
operate; it’s not just what is said, but what is done. However, it should be acknowledged that
how they define long term goals and the responsibility the government and society have to
achieving those goals is equally important in the establishment of norms and understanding of
democracy. As previously mentioned, this paper aims to push away from the notion that political
strength and endurance regarding transitional justice and transitional democracies are only
affected by the stability of democratic institutions. Though institutional strength can influence
short-term “official” action, it does not account for the maintenance of long term beliefs. To see
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how institutions have become so deeply embedded in political theory regarding regime change
and the reconstruction of post-conflict societies, one must turn to the theory of democratic
transition.

Transitional Democracy
To understand the theory behind democratic transition, it is important to first
conceptualize what democratic transition is and why it matters. In the most simplistic of terms,
transition is the period of change between regimes. Consequently, democratic transition is the
shift from a non-democratic regime to a democratic one. Transitions are important to the long
term political character of a nation, as the transition can “set a society on a path that shapes its
subsequent political development” (Munck and Leff 1997, 343). Democratic theory and
transition theory emphasize the importance on how the transition manifests itself. There is an
overwhelming belief that “transitions matter because they generate fairly durable legacies that
affect the posttransitional regime and politics” (Munck and Leff 1997, 345). By this, the
scholarship is referring to the many variables involved in a regime change, from the first
discussions of transition to consolidation, and how they ultimately alter the robustness and
development of a democratic regime. From this perspective we can see how certain language,
perspective, and norms can also create legacies, particularly during transitional regimes.
Of these many variables, much of the literature on democratic transition emphasizes the
importance of two things: the actors involved and the method of transition. There is a variety of
actors that can be involved in the transition process at varying degrees: this includes sectors of
civil society, such as workers’ unions and human rights groups; incumbent elites, including the
military officials currently in control; and the anti-incumbent elites, such as multiparty alliances
11

that intend to take political control and steer the state away from authoritarianism and towards
democratization. Political actors during the transition are particularly important in that there can
be lasting impacts stemming from the images and narratives they create about a nation’s past and
future, particularly a nation’s relationship to human rights and democracy.
Once the actors involved in a transition are identified, much scholarly emphasis is put on
the importance of methods of transition. There are many different ways a transitional democracy
can take shape, with variability coming in many shapes and forms. One of the sources of this
variation comes from the nature of the authoritarian regime. In the case of Argentina, a military
coup led to a military dictatorship where a junta headed the institutional regimes. However, this
institutional authoritarian regime was different from prior dictatorships in the sense that it was
what Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) calls a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. These regimes were
“initiated and led by the military” and “claimed to pursue missions of national redemption” by
engaging in severe repression and creating a culture of fear based on murder, torture, and
disappearance of so-called dissidents that the military believed were a threat to the Western
Christian way of life in la patria (Smith 2012, 46). Part of the military’s legacy and method of
legitimizing their repression was through the use of powerful, dehumanizing language.
Considering that rhetorical patterns were central to an authoritarian regime’s governance, it
follows that specific uses of rhetoric would be just as important to a transitional democracy.
This already proves to be an obstacle to future democratization, as democratic transition
can only occur if and when the authoritarian regime before it comes to a close. This is difficult to
do, considering that the reasons most bureaucratic-military regimes come to power in the first
place is a lack of faith in civilian government: “If existing policies seemed in anyway ineffective
or unsuitable, the high command would feel not only justified but obligated to seize power. It
12

was their duty to la patria” (Smith 2012, 84). Seeing how the rhetoric of a mission to save the
nation was part of how the dictatorship viewed itself, it logically leads that a transitional
democracy’s own rhetorical narrative would serve just as much purpose.
Argentina underwent a pacted transition, known for its complex arrangements in which
the outgoing military regime and the incoming democratic government must negotiate what
compromises must be made by both sides in order for the transfer of power to go as smoothly as
possible. The agreements surrounding the transition itself focused mainly on electoral, economic,
and institutional guarantees (Smith 2012, 66). However, especially in terms of transitional justice
processes, the negotiating and bargaining would continue to be a prominent political issue for the
transitional democracy. As sections on transitional justice processes specifically will further
detail, amnesty was a critical part of these negotiations. In these negotiations, there were also no
limits imposed on how certain transitional ideas or goals were to be talked about; there was
solely a focus on institutions. In this way, assertion of rhetorical norms acted almost as a
loophole to avoid direct confrontation.
Another problem that transitional democracies borne of pacted transitions face is the fact
that militaries do not simply disappear at the end of their dictatorships. As Smith (2015)
explains, the military “had a ready exit: They could return to the barracks…More than any other
autocrats, military rulers had a place to go” (63). This is a barrier to the possibility of sweeping
change in pacted reforma transitions such as the ones in Argentina. The military continued to
exist as an institution even after they relinquished their grip on politics. They could “return to the
barracks” and thus reinstate their position as the armed forces of the new democracy. In this
sense, the military becomes the first officially established institution to be created by the new
democracy. This fact adds to the problematic perspective of focusing solely on the power and
13

stability of institutions as the signifier of a democracy’s strength and stability: how can one
reconcile the fact that the strongest institution at the beginning of a democratic transition is the
very group that represents the opposite of democratic rule?
Thus, one of the earliest dilemmas of transitional democracies in these situations is the
focus on establishing control of the military to ensure proper defense of the nation while staving
off any possibility of a coup. However, while the democratic government wanted to impose
significant control over their armed forces, the military itself wanted to maintain a significant
portion of the autonomy they had grown accustomed to while in full control of the nation (Smith
2012, 89). This is one of the many difficulties faced by new democracies that follow military led
authoritarianism. Transitional democracies are forced to walk this fine line between appeasing
the military and appeasing civil society. To displease the military is to risk a coup, but to submit
to their every whim is to lose credibility with civil society. It is reasonable to believe, then, that
rhetoric would advocate certain beliefs and norms that could be carried forward and be enacted
during a more appropriate opportunity in terms of institutional ability for action. Argentina
exemplifies this in the way that human rights trials were put “on hold” in the late 1980s, but were
restarted again in the early 2000s.
There are many determinants regarding what will make or break a new democratic
regime in terms of its ability to develop itself in the face of possible obstacles. Juan Linz and
Alfred Stepan (1996) have conceived theories of transitional democracy that place central focus
on the power of institutions and the rule of law. They describe the most important building
blocks of a successful transitional democracy are “the construction of civil society,
constitutionalism and rule of law, professional norms of the bureaucracy, economic society, and
political institutions from a very low base” (56). Linz and Stepan (1996) also argue that it is the
14

military’s involvement in the transfer of power that is in large part the determining factor of
when and to what degree transitional democracy will be able to establish these institutions (67).
Here there is a clear emphasis on constructing the physical manifestations of democracy. There
is no mention here of the relevance of cultivating democratic ideology and norms through
specific rhetoric. Especially following a dictatorship wrought with human rights abuses, the use
of rhetoric to make clear the intentions of the new democracy in upholding human rights by
breaking with the wrongs of the previous regime are significant in drawing a distinction between
what the state once was and what it intends to be going forward. Part of the difficulties that postmilitary dictatorial transitional democracies must face, and indeed what many transitional
democracies in Latin America experienced in the latter half of the 20 th century, is maintaining a
balance between the threat of the military and ensuring that the citizenry continues to have faith
in the strength and reliability of democracy as a form of government (Linz and Stepan 1996, 67).
By looking beyond short term institutional action and focusing on rhetoric that can influence
norms and understanding in the future, this balance can be maintained.
In delicate situations such as these, it is obvious that instilling ideas of adherence to
democratic principles and the respect of human rights is extremely important when any definitive
action may result in another coup. As Mihai (2010) explains, “Democratic shifts need the
backing of a supportive political and emotional culture” such as “mutual respect, the willingness
to listen, to exchange arguments, and to include the points of view of all affected, tolerance, and
social trust” which are typically missing from the oppressive authoritarianism that precedes it
(193). It is important that the incoming democratic regime make it clear that justice is a
democratic principle that will be upheld by normalizing the idea that all citizens have a voice and
should use it, even if they were victims in another time or place. For many upset by human rights
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abuses, there is a hope and, to a degree an expectation, that the new democracy will do
something to help with reconciliation, whether that procedural justice, memorialization, or aid in
“letting go”.
When focusing only on the role of the military in the transition, the chain reaction
hypothesis stating military strength and involvement in the transition ultimately affects the
ability to create strong democratic institutions makes logical sense. If a military-as-government
decides to return to military-as-institution but retains a certain level of power during the events
leading up to, during, and after the transfer, they will be able to use that power to their
advantage. Their influence will allow them to protect the perpetrators within their ranks, such as
bargaining for amnesty in exchange for an unthreatened return to democratic rule. This process
has been seen in many post-conflict societies in the latter half of the 20th century, a key example
being Argentina. However, as with most political phenomena, it would be erroneous to assume a
simple cause-to-effect relationship, especially in regards to the development of transitional
justice procedures and human rights policies. It would be just as much a mistake to discount the
role military influence can play in these processes; still, methods of transitional justice and
understandings of human rights cannot be explained by this factor alone. Although military
power can affect how and to what degree a transitional democracy could implement their
transitional justice policies and redefine the state’s goals within a short term timeline, it does not
answer the question of what the desired transitional justice policies and state goals will be. The
ideal transitional justice policies, regardless of whether they will be successfully implemented in
the short term, will be heavily influenced by the rhetoric and norms of human rights that a state
decides are fundamental and the responsibility of the state to uphold; this can allow for potential
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future change and policy implementation based on the norms, ideas, and views that have been
reproduced since the transition.
There is a prevailing assumption that institutions and legislation must build off of one
another on the foundations of reasoned and logical deliberation and action. In terms of
establishing a new democratic regime in the wake of authoritarian dictatorship, logical and
procedural action are naturally to be preferred so as to establish a functioning democratic
government as soon as possible. However, human rights and redressing human rights abuses in
particular are not strictly logical processes. As Arabella Lyon (2013) explains, “human rights
deliberations are difficult because they are deliberations across extreme difference, troubled by
recognitions, competing values, and political hegemonies” (3). Emotionality is a key part of
acknowledging and redressing the grievances of victims who have been marginalized by the
heinous acts of the perpetrators, in these cases, the dictatorial regimes. The healing process of
transitional justice must counteract various levels of damage: the logical incongruence of a
government harming its citizens; the emotional damage caused by harm inflicted by humans onto
humans; and the rhetorical damage done through the dehumanizing language of the dictatorial
campaign when referring to its victims. Additionally, the transitional justice process will take
time; transitional justice should also be considered a lifelong process if a community is to truly
ensure that conflict doesn’t occur again. In his analysis of post-communist Poland, Aleks
Szczerbiak (2015) emphasizes the significance of “normative factors and the extent to which the
motives of those pushing for transitional justice may have been genuinely programmatically and
ideologically driven more than [having been] rooted in strategic considerations” (61). The
institutional processes of transitional justice and the legislative frameworks that outline them in
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the first place are based in the norms and rhetoric that shape a nation’s understanding of human
rights; the importance of ideology and framing cannot be discredited.

Transitional Justice
It is important to firstly conceptualize transitional justice and the purpose it serves before
analyzing particular mechanisms. It is especially important to understand that not all postconflict societies view transitional justice the same way, and different methodologies will be
more beneficial depending on the cultural context and ultimate goals of the post-conflict society.
Because not every nation views the relation between human rights and democracy the same, as
we will see, this is an important concept to consider. In the broadest sense of the term,
transitional justice as a concept is centered on answering “questions of what reconstructive
objectives post-conflict societies should pursue and how they should pursue them” (Clark 2009,
191). Transitional justice is the process by which these post-conflict societies identify, define,
and come to terms with the period of mass violence and collectively decide how society and the
state should come to understand and reconstruct itself in light of this historically defining
moment. From this perspective, it is clear how transitional democracies are entwined in the
process of transitional justice: both aim to shift from an unpleasant past to a more pleasant
future; transition is the optimum time to achieve this goal.
The use of the term “transitional justice” is a complex one, as it is temporally limited.
Mihai (2010) explains that “post-conflict justice” or “post-violence justice” are “more
appropriate…for the processes of accountability and reconciliation chosen in the aftermath of
traumatic violence” (184). While the use of the term “transitional justice” denotes that it
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typically accompanies the transitional democracy process, it limits the time frame in which
justice can be pursued. At a certain point, democratic transition comes to an end and, ideally,
democracy is consolidated. Transitional justice, on the other hand, is a process that can never be
considered truly finished, in that the production and reproduction of truth and memory never
have ends. Transitional justice, when it seeks to preserve collective memory, includes the
continuous act of remembering and disallowing the period of conflict to fall into the oblivion of
the past. There is additionally a concern that other transitional justice mechanisms, unlike
memory, are limited in terms of time; this is not so. As the Argentine case will demonstrate,
transitional justice is an enduring process; as long as people continue to talk about all the aspects
of conflict and reconciliation, it continues. Although this paper will continue to use the term
“transitional justice” for the sake of simplicity, it is important to recognize where the
terminology falls short.
In the scholarship and practice of transitional justice, there are several key themes that are
central to any post-conflict society coming to terms with their history of mass violence: justice,
truth, reconciliation, peace, healing, and forgiveness. The feasibility and assigned importance of
each of these themes will vary depending on the social, political, and economic contexts of each
post-conflict society. Clark (2009) states that all post-conflict societies are faced with two
fundamental questions regarding how to proceed in terms of outlining goals and choosing
transitional justice mechanisms: “First, is it necessary and feasible to punish the perpetrators of
mass crimes? Second, if it is necessary and feasible…what is punishment designed to achieve?”
(192). For the first question, feasibility can range from stability of the incoming regime, potential
threats regarding a return to violent conflict such as via a coup, or financial flexibility. For the
second question, punishment can serve various purposes, depending on how society and the state
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view its relation to aiding reconciliation. Different forms of punishment will lead to different
outcomes and will affect certain ideas of how human rights are best protected. . This brings us to
a central part of understanding transitional justice theoretically and practically: justice.
Clark (2009) explains that there are three main forms of justice that a post-conflict
society can choose to pursue: retributive, deterrent, and restorative. Retributive justice, according
to Clark (2009), “holds that perpetrators must be punished” and that must be held accountable
and get “what they supposedly ‘deserve’” (197). This more litigious view of justice as crimeand-punishment is based on the definition of justice as being the logical conclusion to the
breaking of pre-established laws. In the case of human rights violations, this would entail
standing trial, presenting and contesting evidence, and receiving sufficient punishment for the
crimes for which they are found guilty, typically through jail time. As will later be evidenced in
the analysis of the UN Universal Declaration on Human rights, this is reflected in the
international understanding of human rights. The deterrent perspective on justice “holds that
punishment is necessary... [to] help discourage a convicted perpetrator from committing another
crime…and also to discourage current or potential criminals” (Clark 2009, 197). Contrary to
retributive justice which asserts that punishment for a crime and the establishment of the rule of
law is the ultimate goal, deterrent justice views it as a means to an end. This conception of justice
takes the actions of society rather than individuals into regard; retributive justice views justice as
necessary to teach a lesson to a violator of the law, while deterrent justice is more focused on
instructing society as a whole to behave a certain way going forward.
Without punishment, there is no negative incentive to keep society from committing the
same crime over and over again. Lastly, restorative justice advocates that “punishment of
criminals is necessary but should be facilitated in ways that allow perpetrators and victims to
20

rebuild relationships… In the case of mass crimes such as genocide, restorative justice often
views the reconciliation of entire communities as the ultimate objective” (Clark 2009, 198). This
definition of justice sees crimes not only as the violation of legally ordained rules, but as the
violation of the relationship between two individuals by one person acting violently against
another. This definition of justice looks the farthest into the future in regards to how society will
rebuild itself; beyond setting precedents for the state’s legal response to crime and the motivation
for punishment, the restorative approach defines justice as the method by which the criminal and
the victim reestablish a relationship as members of a common society. It does not advocate for
the disregarding of crimes, but rather having an open dialogue on how to rebuild with the crime
forming a part of the history between two groups or individuals. It should be noted that none of
these types of justice need to be pursued in isolation, and often times all three versions manifest
themselves in different ways. However, all are dependent on the significantly different
conceptualizations of one thing: justice
Already from looking at the variation in definitions of justice, it can be seen how rhetoric
is important. Restorative justice in particular puts an emphasis on dialogue and communication,
and all three set a precedent for how a nation will view justice’s purpose and how it will look as
a process. How a state defines justice and attempts to pursue it in the immediate aftermath of
widespread violence can have lasting effects on how justice is viewed and carried out going
forward. For example, if justice is viewed as punishing perpetrators in a court of law, then
policies and norms will reflect that. With definitions of justice as an example, it is clear how
rhetoric regarding human rights more broadly can have a similar impact on long term
understandings.
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The second transitional justice topic to look at is closely related to justice: the subject of
truth. Clark (2009) observes that “truth after conflict relates to people’s understandings of what
occurred during periods of mass violence” (203). Truth in this context does not just mean having
a clear, agreed upon understanding of what happened, but to also understand how it happened the
way it did, and why it happened in the first place. It also means making clear what did not
happen; in the case of Argentina, this meant refuting that the human rights violations instigated
by military were in any way justified. Truth in the context of transitional justice is difficult in the
sense that there are problems in trying to identify a single, all-encompassing truth that includes
the memories and experiences of all those involved: “…attempts to produce an account of the
past that will adequately represent, and be acceptable to, all individuals and groups who engage
in the post-conflict truth process are inherently limited and likely to prove acrimonious” (Clark
2009, 203). The problem of defining the truth of a period of mass violence is that the story itself
is based on senseless violence; to try and derive meaning or come up with explanations for
horrendous human rights violations will always prove exceedingly difficult if not altogether
impossible. What’s more, many of the Truth Commissions in the Southern Cone—stateorganized groups tasked with creating a unified truth—have relied on aggregated testimony from
thousands of individuals. To try and create a national facts-centered narrative based on the
deeply traumatizing and emotional experiences of thousands of people is an incredibly difficult
task to take on, and one that will most likely be contested by many.
There are three areas of truth as transitional justice according to Clark (2009): truthtelling, truth hearing, and truth-shaping. Truth-telling is rather self-explanatory, as it involves the
public recitation of what happened with the ultimate goal being to provide legal evidence and/or
serve as a mode of catharsis (204). Truth-hearing refers to the willingness of the public to receive
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the truth that is being told, as different groups or sectors of society will have different responses
to the emotional accounts that are part of the evidentiary and cathartic processes (204). Lastly
truth-shaping refers to “the ways in which parties external to the initial truth-telling and truth
hearing receive and re-mold evidence” (204). This aspect of truth can be misused and
manipulative depending on who is using these narratives and how. In particular, historians and
political officials may use these testimonies and personal histories to reconstruct the truth to
serve their own interests, contrary to what the original participants may have wanted regarding
the use of their testimony.
Perhaps the most complex part of transitional justice is reconciliation. Clark (2009)
remarks that, broadly, “reconciliation involves the rebuilding of fractured individual and
communal relationships” focused on “encouraging meaningful interaction and cooperation
between former antagonists” (194). Reconciliation is more than a peaceful cohabitation of the
same space, a situation in which the parties may simply avoid each other and the topic of conflict
rather than attempt to mend and reconstruct relationships; it requires “individuals and groups to
interact and cooperate in often difficult circumstances” as it must “honestly and directly address
the root causes of conflict, and the overwhelming feelings of grievance and anger” (194). Much
transitional justice scholarship views reconciliation as the ultimate and most difficult goal to be
achieved in the transitional justice process, and indeed it requires a lot of time and energy.
Reconciliation aims to bring perpetrators, victims, and bystanders together to acknowledge what
happened and the emotional effects of violence, both individual and collective, and incorporate
that understanding into the reconstruction of social relationships. The best way to achieve
reconciliation will vary; reconciliation may mean leaving certain aspects in the past in order to
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not reopen old wounds, or it may mean confronting all aspects of the past despite the emotional
turmoil of doing so.
The last three aspects of transitional justice are similar, though they differ in key ways:
peace, healing, and forgiveness. It is generally understood that peace is a prerequisite to most
transitional justice processes, as the continuation of violence inhibits most other processes,
reconciliation especially. Healing focuses on the well-being of “traumatized individuals” who
“may need to overcome feelings of anguish, loss, or hatred toward others before they can feel
ready to reconcile with them” (195). Healing is a predominantly personal and individualized
experience based on the traumas that each person experienced. However, groups and
communities can go through processes of healing together based on mutually experienced
traumas. Forgiveness is one of the more controversial transitional justice topics. There is a fear
that, besides having predominantly Christian overtones to it that isolate many sectors of the
world, forgiveness makes way for amnesty, impunity, and intentional forgetting. To be
conducive to the rebuilding of a post-conflict society, forgiveness in the context of transitional
justice “requires active, sometimes public acknowledgement of crimes committed, [that] leaves
open the possibility that victims will seek redress from perpetrators and perhaps insist on
punishing them” (Clark 2009, 202). How forgiveness is meant to operate in the context of a postconflict society, then, is that it is meant to give power and agency to the victims: it is ultimately
up to them as individuals to forgive or not forgive perpetrators, nor can it be forced, and
forgiveness does not in any way mean that they are absolved of their crimes or free from
punishment. What’s more, it is important to acknowledge that forgiveness in no way requires or
guarantees that parties will reconcile.
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From these understanding of the two concepts, transitional justice and transitional
democracies are very closely intertwined. By operating with each other, transitional justice and
transitional democracies are able to strengthen the integrity and long-term staying power of each
other through the principle of liberty. MacAuliffe (2017) observes that “democracy was
conceived as tolerant, rights-based and protective of economic and political freedoms, and
transitional justice was believed to help usher it in by drawing a line in the sand between the
regimes” (36). Transitional justice is able to demarcate between the previous oppressive regime
and the new democratic regime by setting a precedent for what the latter intends to center itself
on: rights. Furthermore, democracy acts as a platform for transitional justice methods to be
implemented with input from the civic body it intends to serve. In this way, the two processes are
reliant on one another in the shared goal of a future that has a central focus on undeniable rights.

Rhetoric
Knowing what we know about transitional justice and transitional democracy, we can see
that norms and conceptualizations are central underlying components of both processes.
However, not much has been done to explore such a relationship. The goal should not be to make
an assertion or claim that transitional processes and the establishment of certain norms are
inherently related; rather the goal is to show that there is a symbiotic relationship developed
between them that comes from a state and society’s assumptions about democracy and human
rights’ relation to each other.
Campbell and Burkholder (1997) define rhetoric as “persuasive discourses, written and
oral, encountered face-to-face or through the electronic or print media, that seek to affect
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attitudes and actions” (3). Throughout this thesis, this is the definition that will be used when
discussing rhetoric. A key element particularly relevant to this essay is the fact that rhetoric
focuses on “the values that individuals should adopt, the implications of those values, and the
means or policies individuals and societies should enact to express or attain those values” (4).
Rhetoric is utilized with the intention of influencing norms of behavior and perception,
something that is central during a transitional political period. A transitional democracy must
outline why democracy is the preferable style of governance, explain what democracy aims to do
and how it will effectively do so, and convince various sectors of society that adhering to the
rules of the democratic game is in everyone’s best interest. In the wake of brutal
authoritarianism, this is especially important when trying to convince a society to have faith in
their state at all; this faith in democracy can in part be established by connecting it to a
dedication to human rights.
Krebs and Jackson (2007) observe that rhetoric has tended to play a secondary role in
political analysis, although there is beginning to be a shift. They observe that much of political
analysis is focused on ideas, with rhetoric being largely ignored beyond how the words “reflect
actors’ true beliefs, with private statements seen as more revealing than public pronouncements,”
(37). This is problematic due to the fact that rhetoric is the fundamental base for the
communication of thoughts, ideas, and conceptualizations between individuals and groups of
people. As Finlayson (2004) explains, “In order to explain some aspects of political and policy
change within and around government, one needs to understand the role of ideas” (530). He
advocates for a world in which political science “[conceives] of politics through, rather than in
spite of, its rhetorical nature” (Finlayson 2004, 529). Understanding, discussing, and analyzing
politics within the field of political science is undeniably predicated on having common
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definitions for terms; this is true not only for political science but for all realms of academia and
indeed for basic human communication. It is with this understanding that rhetoric must be
included not only as a methodology but as an explanatory variable as well in the political
analysis of human rights and democracy.
Rhetoric deconstructs, constructs, produces, and reproduces the world as experienced by
the orator and their audience. The words, phrases, definitions, and ideas that make up a social
lexicon are responsible for creating the concepts and actions they aim to describe. Rhetoric can
be used to erase certain experiences or ideas by limiting how they are discussed; similarly,
rhetoric can open up the way certain events and notions can be understood and acknowledged by
broadening the terminologies and conceptualizations that are available in the discourse. Thinking
of this as applied to post-conflict societies, this is especially important when creating a narrative
of truth in transitional justice.
Much of political analysis especially in the realm of transitional justice and transitional
democracy theory has been primarily concerned with institutional function and maintenance.
This aspect of transition, when compared to rhetoric, is more accessible in terms of measurability
and its effects are more easily observable, perhaps lending to its popularity as the primary
explanatory variable for the types of human rights policies enacted by states. Finlayson (2004)
makes the case that much of modern political science has defined “political phenomena [as] only
outputs of social interactions, rather than inputs, and institutions primarily bargaining arenas for
individuals or collectives concerned with optimization and whose moral, philosophical,
ideological or other, normative, motivations are of minimal importance to analysis” (532). The
function of ideas is not “necessarily to be accurate or even adequate” in the way they portray the
world, leading to ideas and rhetoric standing at odds with political science’s preference for
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objective, measurable, so-called truths (Finlayson 2004, 535-536). There has, however, been an
important shift in recent work in political science, particularly when tying rhetoric to norm
construction and policy choice (Bolsen 2013; Payne 2001; Finlayson and Martin 2008; Nelson
2004). This is reflective of how rhetoric does in fact prove useful to the analysis of politics, not
just as a byproduct but as a causal variable as well.
As stated above, the aim of this paper is not to discredit the role that institutions play in
the development of democracy and post-conflict justice, but both can be better understood
through rhetoric. Arabella Lyon (2013) makes that case that “rights…are acts of participation
formed in conversations among community members and carried out in repeated behaviors or
actions which re-enforce them as norms” (6). The conceptualization of rights and specifically
human rights, for both democracy and transitional justice, is developed through “performative
deliberation” that set the stage on which political institutions will operate (Lyon 2013, 6). These
conceptualizations and norms will ultimately have an impact on institutional goals and
consequently whether an institution will be deemed effective at reaching them.
It is with this understanding in mind that this paper aims to shift the scholarly dialogue
towards rhetorical analysis to better understand how patterns in human rights policy can be
tracked from the immediate aftermath of the post-conflict period to the present day. By analyzing
the rhetoric surrounding human rights, justice, and democratic responsibility, I aim to show how
definitions of these ideas that are developed during the transitional democracy and transitional
justice periods, ultimately becoming foundational to a nation’s understanding of them and the
states relationship to them.
Another reason supporting the inclusion of rhetoric in studies of transitional justice and
transitional democracy is that these authoritarian regimes did not draw their authority solely from
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institutional power, but also through rhetoric that reinforced the culture of terror and justification
of repression and state terror. As the case study of Argentina will show, these regimes and the
military officials that led them used an array of dehumanizing language to paint their
opponents—in these cases, real and imagined communist subversives—as subhuman and thus
undeserving of human rights. Dehumanizing language was a common tactic used to create
distance between the ideal citizen and subversives or enemies of the state. Language that
depicted state opponents as pests that needed to be exterminated, parasites that need to be
removed, or cancers that needed to cut out of society worked in two ways: firstly, it made a
compelling argument to the rest of society that these opponents were degrading the nation as a
whole which in turn was meant to dissuade people from joining their ranks; and secondly, by
removing any notion of humanity from these opponents, the terrors enacted against them could
no longer be considered violations of human rights. The use of this type of language, of saving
the society from a detrimental pestilence and preserving the integrity of a nation, represents the
powerful influence of rhetoric in regards to human rights. The military in Latin American history
has played a heroic role in the region’s pursuit of independence. By playing on this narrative and
invoking the traditional imagery of the military protecting the nation’s future against enemies
who want to bring it down, the military regimes were able to use rhetoric to further justify their
abuse of human rights. It is with this understanding that if the military regime utilized rhetoric to
dehumanize their opponents and thus justify their repression, then rhetoric would have just as
much of a significant role in the transitional regime the succeeded it.
Rhetoric plays a central role in how the transitional regime sets the ideological
foundation for how human rights and democracy are conceived in the aftermath of
authoritarianism. Part of the transition process involves redefining the new regime and making a
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clear distinction between it and the previous one. Each new democracy must wrestle with the
very definition of what it means to be a democracy, as well as how becoming a democracy is
intertwined with how human rights are imagined and in turn how justice is imagined. This
process becomes even more crucial in the wake of dictatorships like those in the Southern Cone.
What makes them undemocratic, anti-human rights, and unjust also contributes to the definitions
of democracy, human rights, and justice. These definitions are created by internal circumstances
as well as external ones. Democratic governance, upholding human rights, and sustaining justice
are performative acts in and of themselves, particularly in a globalized world where human rights
have been universalized and transnationalized. It is for this reason that the study of political
rhetoric in this context especially serves a great purpose.

30

CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY
The case study I have selected comes from the Southern Cone of Latin America:
Argentina. Argentina differs in several important ways from other parts of Latin America. The
country’s demographics reflect a primarily white populace of European, due in part to the heavy
influx of European immigrants and cultural influence throughout the colonial and post-colonial
periods. In addition to this fact, the countries of the Southern Cone such as Argentina have
exhibited historically different relationships to the indigenous Amerindian populations when
compared to other Latin American nations. Quijano (2008) observes that in Argentina in
particular, European immigrants preferred to maintain their European identities and “cultural
differences, while at the same time explicitly rejecting the identity associated with Latin
America’s heritage and, in particular, any relationship with the indigenous population”, which
kept the two groups separate in addition to keeping Amerindian populations from being included
in the national identity later on (563). In a similar vein, the percentage of the national population
that identifies as being of African or Afro-Latino descent is extremely low in comparison to
other Latin American countries, particularly Brazil. This is not to say or make any such claim
that the rhetoric and policies enacted by these states later on is predicated the populations being
homogenous or predominately white; rather, it is to acknowledge that Latin America is in no way
uniform, and historical, cultural, and sociological differences such as these should be taken into
account when considering how state terror was practiced and how transitional justice responded
to it.
Argentina also had a specific dictatorial experience. 3 This bureaucratic-authoritarian
regime was led by a repressive military junta that operated under the mission statement that the
3

Though in no way was this experience completely unique.
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Christian and Westernized way of life that had been cultivated in the region was being threatened
by communist and Marxist subversives. The dictatorship’s reaction to the supposed threat was
infamously excessive, and was characterized by suspicion, threats, kidnappings, illegal
imprisonment, sequestration in military detention, tortures, disappearances, killings, and a
general cultural of fear. The regimes of Argentina and many other Operation Condor member
nations would work together to detain, interrogate, torture, and disappear suspected political
dissidents that were considered threats to Latin America’s integrity during the Cold War. As
mentioned in the section on democratic transition, Argentina experienced a pacted transition
which reinstated civilian rule; nevertheless, the military was able to maintain significant review
and input on the transition itself.

Country Case Selection
The decision to make Argentina the central case for this study is twofold: first, the
amount of time that has passed between the end of the dictatorship and the present, and second,
the trailblazing role that Argentina has played in the transitional justice and transitional
democracy wave of the late 20th century. While many other nations in Latin America underwent
similar repressive periods at around the same time, Argentina’s transition was able to serve as a
model for many of these countries.
Argentina’s democratic transition began in 1983 with the election of Radical Party
candidate Raúl Alfonsín. Since then, Argentina has had four different long-term presidents. The
phrase “long-term” in this case is meant to exclude Fernando de la Rúa, Ramón Puerta, Adolfo
Rodríguez Saá, Eduardo Camaño, and Eduardo Duhalde, who were all appointed head of the
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executive branch during the height of the economic crisis from December 2001 to January 2002.
The reason these individuals are excluded is that, with the exception of Duhalde 4 and de la Rúa5,
each of their appointed terms lasted on average two days, and at most a week. It is for this
reason, in addition to the fact that the economic crisis was the central point of concern during this
period, that these individuals will not be included in this analysis.
Nevertheless, Argentina has had 35 years to cultivate policy and rhetoric surrounding the
principles of democracy and human rights and the way they overlap. Indeed, many of the longterm presidents have made both these topics central points of their election platforms and
eventual policy positions. This expanse of time allows the end of the dictatorship and the
transition period to still be fresh in the nation’s mind, but has also allowed democratic
consolidation to take place (Schamis 2002). With full democratic consolidation having occurred
nearly 20 years ago today, there has been plenty of time for Argentina to establish clear norms on
how democracy and human rights should and do interact with one another and develop policies
and political positions that reflect this.
The second point, that Argentina was a pioneer of transitional justice practices, refers to
the fact that many other countries would use Argentina as a model for their own transitional
justice processes, especially in terms of creating Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.
Argentina made truth commissions and the idea that reconciliation could not transpire without
truth a fundamental part of transitional justice for many nations going through their own
transition processes, including Uruguay, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,

4

Duhalde would go on to be President of Argentina for the next two years after his appointment, but like de la Rúa,
was primarily focused with recovering from the economic crisis.
5 de la Rúa was primarily concerned with the sharp economic downturn that hit Argentina at the turn of the century
and the subsequent riots that ultimately led him to resign in 2001. For this reason, there is very little of his
positionality on human rights or democratic consolidation.
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Haiti, Panama, Peru, Paraguay within Latin America, and Nigeria East Timor, Germany, and
South Africa beyond the regional level (Wright 2007, 145-6). As the rhetorical analysis will
show, Argentina was keenly aware on their global impact on how post-conflict societies thought
about human rights and democracy. The fact that Argentina had such a widespread and lasting
effect on the way multiple regions went about their transitional justice processes and thought
about the relationship between truth and reconciliation is truly demonstrative of the exceptional
place that Argentina holds in this area of academic research.
In addition to the dissemination of truth and reconciliation committees, Argentina is also
well known for its bold decision to go forward with trials against the military organizers and
perpetrators of violence. Many political scientists specializing in democratic transition and
transitional justice theory at the time cautioned against the use of trials for fear that causing any
extraneous tension between the incoming and outgoing regimes could undermine the trajectory
of democratic transition and consolidation. It was widely believed that trials and the undoing of
self-imposed amnesty laws from the previous regime could potentially instigate another military
coup. This belief that the pursuit of truth and justice during a transition was “letting [the
nation’s] convictions undermine their long-term goals” of democratic consolidation (Sikkink and
Walling 2007, 429). Sikkink and Walling (2007) have found that contrary to this belief, at least
within Latin America, “there is not a single case of a country where democracy has been
undermined because of a choice to use trials” (442). Although there is now evidence proving
this, the fact that trials were believed to be a danger to democracy in transition at the time
signifies Argentina’s boldness and their commitment to justice as a requisite for reconciliation.
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Document Selection
For the purpose of this study, I emphasized regime-centric sources for analysis. This
includes written works, public speeches, laws, and other demonstrative political acts officially
sanctioned and presented by the democratic regime. Primarily, these statements and acts come
directly from the various Argentine presidents, or in the case of the Nunca Más report,
specifically commissioned by the president. The choice to use these official, regime-based
documents rather than pieces from the media or statements from civil society stems from the
interest in how the regime views itself and the role it plays in upholding justice and democracy,
and how it attempts to project itself to its citizenry as well as the rest of the world.
It should be noted that the media and sectors of civil society, particularly human rights
groups within the country, both play very important roles in creating and establishing a national
conversation on democracy and human rights and the way they overlap. As MacAuliffe (2017)
describes it, “civil society can employ soft power, persuading governments to adopt ideas or
change behaviors through attraction, exhortation and example… civil society and victim
mobilization can effect [sic] shifts in agency and power relations over time even in the face of
official opposition due to long-term participation, constituency building and new patterns of
engagement” (56). Despite a change in administration or official government position, an
established collective of people with a certain body of ideas and concepts regarding human rights
can keep governments in line with civil society’s concept of human rights and the responsibility
democratic institutions have to them. The influence from these two sectors are so important that
they each require their own works solely dedicated to their own analysis. Even just looking at the
interactions between civil society, the media, and the government would require its own separate
research. For this reason, this paper deals only with rhetoric directly from the democratic regime.
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Beyond domestic documents from the regime, this analysis also deals with statements on
human rights from the most salient non-domestic document to this analysis: UN Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, which predated the transition by several decades. Additionally, as
it had been signed by Argentina at the time of its ratification, it can be assumed that this
document was influential in how people generally thought about human rights prior to the full
transition period. The importance of using international documents in addition to domestic ones
is based in the idea of human rights as being universal and, in a sense, globalized. If human
rights are in fact thought of as being universal, then there would have to be a set of transnational
concepts about them. Because of the international nature of human rights, it is necessary to look
externally as well as internally to find the roots and patterns of use surrounding human rights
rhetoric. The goal of using these international documents that predate the transition is to look for
any ideas that potentially appear later in Argentina’s rhetoric. Additionally, as Argentina did not
have a specific country case to model its own transition after, it would make sense that they
would turn to international documents to construct their ideas and goals for transition.
Method of Analysis
The overall method for approaching the rhetorical analysis of these documents centers on
finding patterns in the usage of certain words, phrases, associations, and ideas relating to
democracy and human rights. The most important ideas and concepts to be analyzed concern: 1)
humanity, such as what it means to be human or certain inalienable properties of being human;
2) justice, including preferred types of justice as outlined in the section on transitional justice
theory, the relationship between justice and reconciliation; 3) rights, such as the overlap between
universal human rights and the specific rights afforded by democracy; 4) democracy, specifically
its characteristics and its relationship in upholding and respecting human rights; and 5) truth, its
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relationship to justice and reconciliation, its implications for the transitional justice process, and
its role in creating the foundations of democracy.
These fundamental terms are traced throughout relevant speeches and acts, focusing on
the rhetorical carbon dating of specific terms, individual words, or greater points related to the
key concepts of humanity, justice, rights, democracy, and truth. The analysis attempts to see
how the state has constructed and maintained a specific pattern of rhetoric outlining the ways
that democracy and human rights are deeply intertwined.
The documents selected were also chosen based on the language in which they could be
acquired. When collecting these speeches, I looked specifically for documents that were in the
original Argentine Spanish. The purpose of this was to avoid the problems that accompany
multiple translations. Translations of certain words or phrases from Spanish to English will vary
and change depending on the translator and the context in which the work is translated. With this
in mind, I aimed to find the original documents to better support my argument that certain
rhetorical norms (through words, phrases, and ideas) can be traced across time. With the
exception of some particular speeches or quotes, all these speeches were in the original
Argentine Spanish. 6

6

Or as Argentines prefer to call it, castellano.
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RHETORICAL ANALYSIS
Source Selection
The pool of primary sources that are drawn from are a critical part of rhetorical analysis.
For this particular study, the rhetorical analysis was done specifically on regime-guided
documents. The term “regime-guided” refers to rhetorical acts that were presented by a
figurehead of the regime (e.g. the president or a member of the president’s cabinet) or by a
collective/organization that was commissioned or created by the regime to carry out specific
tasks (e.g. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions). Because this paper aims to analyze how the
transitional period is handled by an incoming regime, it stands to reason that the documents
being studied are ones composed and performed by the regime. This is not an attempt to ignore
the influential effects of civil society, but rather to narrow the focus onto how the regime
imagined itself and attempted to transmit that imagination to the national and international
community.
This section also requires an investigation into the source of certain ideas and principles
that the new regime was trying to demonstrate an affinity for. This entails looking at domestic
and international documents and rhetorical acts that predate the transitional period. This includes
international documents that assert the universality of human rights and rhetorical acts made
during the dictatorship that the transitional regime actively tries to counteract with their own
rhetorical acts.
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Part of the rhetorical analysis of human rights policy requires understanding where the
ideas and conceptualizations of human rights originate in the first place. It is important to
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recognize that the policies taken on by Argentina were not solely domestically significant, but
performative on an international and transnational level as well. The United Nation’s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) set forth the idea that there were, in fact, a collection of
universal human rights that had to be respected. This document is still significant in the study
and definition of contemporary human rights. With this in mind, it should be considered how
positions on human rights laid out by international organizations influenced the rhetoric used and
policies implemented in Argentina.
The fundamental notions of how the United Nations viewed what human rights were,
how they could be violated, and how they were to be protected can be seen very clearly in the
preamble of the declaration:
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace
in the world…” (United Nations 1948)
The repeated use of the word “inherent” throughout the document is important. There is an
acknowledgement and idea that to be human is to have rights. Rights, specifically human rights,
are not constructed by states or based in ideologies, but rather are connected to human existence
in a more biological sense of inherency. The same goes for the use of the term “inalienable”,
which also appears throughout the text at various points. Inalienable evokes a similar sense that
these are rights that cannot be taken away or undermined in any way, by any state or individual
actor. The idea that these rights are inherent and inalienable come up often in Argentine rhetoric
on human rights. The phrase “all members of the human family” plays to the pathos of the reader
as well as to the UN members who drafted the declaration. By referencing a human family, there
is an overt implication that everyone is connected by love and by blood as well, once again
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bringing to mind the idea of biology and strict, inviolable laws of science. Also by evoking the
image of a family, it again rejects the idea that humanity in terms of human rights are connected
by states and laws. The first paragraph closes with an emphasis on “the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world”. The ordering of these three fundamentals implicate that there is
an ordering and linearity to how respect and protection of human rights develops: to have peace,
you must have justice, but to have justice, you must have freedom. Again, this logic appears in
Argentine rhetoric many times over.
Another important aspect to take into consideration is the versions that would have been
referenced by Argentina. The nation would have referenced the official Spanish translation
version of the document which, while making the same statements, is not a direct translation.
The following is the same excerpt as above, but in the Spanish translation version:
“Considerando que la libertad, la justicia y la paz en el mundo tienen por base el
reconocimiento de la dignidad intrínseca y de los derechos iguales e inalienables de todos
los miembros de la familia humana;” (Naciones Unidas 1948)

7

Though similar, this version differs in significant ways from the English version. While the
English version closes with a reference to “freedom, justice and peace”, the Spanish lan guage
version instead opens with these three fundamentals. The reader of the English language version
is first asked by the document to consider the “recognition” of universal “dignity” and “rights”,
whereas the reader of the Spanish language version is first presented with the ideas of liberty,
justice, and peace first. The English version is structured to first present the answers to the

A more direct translation of this version back to English would be: “Considering that liberty, justice and peace in
the world are based in recognition of the intrinsic dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family;” Libertad could also be translated as “freedom”. Considerando que could also be translated as
“Whereas”.
7
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question of “What is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world?” while the
Spanish version opens with the question itself. It follows that the reader of the Spanish version
may proceed through the document thinking about the importance of freedom, justice and peace
while the English version’s reader focuses on inherent and inviable nature of human rights. The
differences in how these two languages write the same thing relates to the general language rules
for each language when it comes to what sounds the most “normal”. This is why direct
translations, though understandable, may feel somewhat disjointed compared to how they flow in
their original language.
There is also a frequent appeal to the idea that respect of human rights is associated with
a more civilized society. Early on in the preamble, the document states that “disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of
mankind,” and that human rights being respected through various freedoms are “the highest
aspiration of the common people” (United Nations 1948). This appeal to the idea of civilized vs.
uncivilized is evident in the use of the word barbarous to describe the characteristics of human
rights violations. There is an indication that if a state or collective is to be considered modern, it
cannot infringe upon these universal rights. Such an idea appears briefly throughout Argentina’s
rhetoric, indicating that the rhetoric of the UN document and documents like it most likely
influenced Argentina’s conceptualizations of human rights.
There are two other concepts that take center stage in the depiction of rights laid out by
the United Nations: the rule of law and democracy. The preamble to the Declaration states that
“it is essential…that human rights should be protected by the rule of law” (United Nations 1948).
The use of the term “rule of law” brings a very litigious element to the conceptualization of
human rights as well as justice. From the perspective of rule of law, human rights are debated
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within the confines of a court of law according to prewritten rules; it is through these rules and
regulations that human rights are protected and the violators of these rights are prosecuted. This
in turn implies a retributive image of justice; violators will face punishment according to
guidelines laid out by the law. Articles 6 and 7 elaborate on the idea that the law is the ultimate
defense for human rights, as “everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law”, “all are equal before the law”, and everyone is given “equal protection of the
law” (United Nations 1948). Litigious, rule of law based rhetoric is very prominent in
transitional Argentina, especially in the rhetoric originating from the early transitional period.
This rhetoric demonstrates that the law is the ultimate protector and arbiter of human rights and
humanity. Thus, the rule of law creates a reality in which the law—both in the sense of
undeniable, fixed principles as well as the agreed upon regulations set by a collective—is the
method by which human rights and their violations are defined in resolute and determinate way.
In this interpretation, human rights are defined and held up by laws, not people. This frame
ignores the unavoidable role that people as individuals and groups undeniably have in the
defining of human rights. Argentina pushes back in this regard, as much of the rhetoric from the
transition period deals with the importance of civil society’s participation in the democracy and
transitional justice processes.
Rule of law is also closely associated with democracy. Through this association, it is
evident how the United Nations’ Declaration implies that democracy itself is a human right.
Article 21 is explicitly about democracy without outright referring to it by name. This article
explains that everyone is allowed to participate in government, “directly or through freely chosen
representatives”, and that government should be a direct reflection of “the will of the people”
which will be “expressed in periodic and genuine elections” that are based on principles of
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“universal and equal suffrage” (United Nations 1948). This is the most basic outline for
democracy, stating that to have any other form of governance that is not a liberal democratic one
is to immediately violate human rights. This can be interpreted as saying that should a nation
uphold all the other prerequisites for the maintenance and respect of human rights, then
democracy is an expectable outcome. Regardless of the direction of causality, there is most
certainly an assertion that human rights and representative democracy are correlated so strongly
and that the former cannot exist without the latter.
The purpose of analyzing the UN Declaration is not to assert that this was a foundational
text or framework for Argentina’s understanding of human rights; rather, it serves to demonstrate
that judicialized conceptualizations of human rights that were foundational to Argentine rhetoric
preceded the transition. It also appeared in other documents such as the 1978 Pact of San Jose.8
Although the use of judicialized rhetoric was not new at the time of the Argentine transition,
Argentina was able to further develop it and apply it to their particular situation. This is
demonstrative of two fundamentals: first, the dynamic and ever changing nature of human rights
within international understanding, and second, the role that Latin America has played in
informing the conversation on universal human rights. The many nations of Latin America and
Argentina in particular have contributed to the global discussion and interpretation of what it
means to respect and uphold human rights through the pursuit of their own transitional justice
processes and the construction of their own rhetoric and policy. As the following analysis will
demonstrate, the rhetoric produced and reproduced in Argentina demonstrates how the nation
contributed to an international discussion through development of their own understandings of
human rights.

8

Also known as the American Convention on Human Rights.
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Speeches from President Alfonsín
President Raúl Alfonsín was elected Argentina’s first post-authoritarian president on
October 30, 1983 on a platform centered on the creation of a democracy that would have “real
power to defend the rights of all” and a promise to bring an end to Argentina’s “historic cycle of
impunity” (Wright 2007, 142). Within the first few days after his inauguration, Alfonsín dove
into multiple initiatives aimed at establishing respect for human rights under Argentina’s new
democratic regime. Among these initiatives, he “met with human rights organizations; submitted
a bill to rescind the military’s amnesty decree…began freeing political prisoners…He also
pushed for quick approval of international human rights instruments that Argentina had not
previously ratified” (Wright 2007, 142). Alfonsín was aware that since Argentina had no country
on which it could model its transition, it would have to proceed into mostly uncharted waters.
This also meant, however, that Argentina could serve as a model for other nations in Latin
America and across the globe during their transitions. With concern for respecting human rights
and the establishment of democracy in mind, Alfonsín’s regime set off to redefine democracy
and its responsibility to upholding human rights.
President Alfonsín’s inaugural speech is a representative example of how the transitional
regime wanted to conceptualize democracy and human rights going forward. There is an
awareness throughout the speech that the task of reestablishing democratic norms and creating an
environment in which human rights are respected in the wake of dictatorial repression is
difficult. However, it is made clear that each and every member of Argentine society has a role
to play in producing and reproducing these norms: “It will be difficult, because we have the
enormous responsibility today and for all time to ensure respect for democracy and the dignity of
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man on Argentine soil”; “We will create the country that we deserve” (Alfonsín, December 10 th,
1983) 9,10. Both of these statements imply that by being democratic citizens, each individual
plays a valuable role in developing democracy and that is by nature highly participatory. What’s
more, it is also implied here that democracy and respect for human rights go hand in hand; the
period of transition should be utilized to ensure respect is cultivated for both human rights and
democracy, rather than just to establish democratic transitions and wait for consolidation.
Similarly, by saying that the democracy Argentina deserves must be created, it can be reasoned
that democracy and human rights are not simply established once and remain fixed; they must
constantly be reaffirmed and reestablished. The best way that this can be achieved is through the
reproduction of certain ideas about democracy and human rights; this can be achieved through
specific patterns of rhetoric.
The idea that democracy must constantly be reproduced and reaffirmed by the citizenry
comes up throughout the speech. It is clear through this speech that the new regime is attempting
to create a democracy that truly reflects the will of the civil population, something that was
outright ignored during the military dictatorship. Later on, Alfonsín states: “We are going to
[make the country we deserve], not through the work and grace of enlightened rulers, but rather
for that which the plaza is singing, because ‘the people united will never be defeated’” (Alfonsín,
December 10th, 1983). Through explaining that democracy must come from the will of the
people, what the citizenry is saying and believes in, rather than the behind the scenes actions of
politicians demonstrates the early establishment of norms of participation in democracy.

“Será difícil, porque tenemos todos las enorme responsabilidad de asegurar hoy y para los tiempos la
democracia y el respeto por la dignidad del hombre en la tierra argentina.”
10 “Vamos a hacer el país que nos merecemos.”
9

45

Evident also through Alfonsín’s earliest speeches is that the rule of law is an equally
important aspect of upholding democratic norms. Respect for the rule of law inhibits impunity.
Alfonsín explains, “Such impunity would signify the giving up of certain fundamental ethical
principles, putting the prevention of future [human rights] violations at risk” (Alfonsín,
December 13th, 1983). Again, one of Alfonsín’s goals enumerated in his campaign platform was
to make accountability a cornerstone of Argentina’s new democracy, something that can be
achieved through the rule of law. From the perspective of human rights and retributive justice as
outlined by transitional justice theory, the rule of law refers to a system in which individuals are
consistently held accountable for their crimes in accordance with specific rules and laws that
attain validity in that they have been “sanctioned following previously and carefully dictated
procedures” (O’Donnell 2004, 33). Without a respect for the rule of law, there is no standard by
which people are judged in a court or tribunal, and there is subsequently no formal, legal
deterrent to violating human rights. Alfonsín goes so far as to conclude his speech with a
reminder that “democracy must be defended” and in doing so, the government “will not be
neutral towards the enemies of [the] democracy, nor inert nor impotent to combat them”
(Alfonsín, December 13th, 1983). The image that the regime is trying to paint here is clear:
defending democracy means going beyond neutrality towards human rights violations, neutrality
in this case being a stand in for impunity.
This of course brings into play a significant topic in transitional justice literature: whether
conceptualizing justice in a retributive way may be too focused on “getting equal” with
perpetrators and thus serves as a hindrance to eventual reconciliation (David and Choi 2009).
Similarly, a retributive perspective on justice may overlook the benefits of deterrent and
restorative justice mechanisms. However, as O’Donnell (2004) argues, “the rule of law is among
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the essential pillars upon which any high-quality democracy rests”, an idea that is also seen in
the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (32). With this idea in mind, it is fitting in a
period of transitional justice and particularly in a period transitional democracy that retributive
justice would be utilized as a way to promote respect for the rule of law, and correspondingly
promote norms of democratic behavior. In this way, Alfonsín’s speech on the rule of law serves
both to demonstrate the new regime’s acknowledgement and denouncement of the dictatorship’s
human rights violations; simultaneously, democratic norms are established within the legal
system.
From the specific viewpoint of asserting norms of human rights, the speech on the rule
of law serves an important purpose as well: “It is necessary to do justice with those who…have
treated men like mere manipulable objects to obtain certain ends, thus the de facto law of
‘pacification’ or ‘amnesty’ should be repealed and declared null and void” (Alfonsín, December
13th, 1983). 11 In reference to the self-amnesty law that the military dictatorship granted itself
prior to stepping down, Alfonsín goes on to say that upholding the law would be “morally
unacceptable” as well as “politically irresponsible” (December 13 th, 1983). Repealing the
amnesty law serves a double purpose in regards to instating democratic and human rights related
norms. First, repealing the law boosts adherence to democratic norms, as the law was put in
place by de facto powers rather than through the proper legal channels. Such a perspective is
reinforced when Alfonsín calls the amnesty law “legally vicious” and points out that it lacks
legitimacy due to the fact that laws of de facto power are inherently illegitimate (December 13 th,
1983). An amnesty law also serves to bolster impunity, something that the new regime made

“Es necesario hacer justicia con quienes…han tomado a los hombres como meros objetos manipulables para
obtener ciertos fines, implica que debe derogarse y declararse insanablemente nula la ley de facto llamada ‘de
pacificación’ o de ‘amnistía’”.
11
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clear was counter to the goals of the new democracy. Second, the act of repealing the law makes
it clear that amnesty for crimes that so blatantly dehumanized Argentine citizens cannot be
allowed to occur if the new regime is to demonstrate its unceasing respect for human rights. A
precedent is set in this act. Alfonsín states that regardless of the fact that many military
perpetrators were “just following orders”, many of the acts perpetrated by military members
went beyond what was dictated by the de facto law. However, the de facto laws “were in and of
themselves repressive instruments that did not recognize the limits imposed by elementary
principles of liberal criminal law: the pains they inflicted, especially that of death, were
draconian, of a criminal nature, imprecise and open, their procedures violating basic guarantees”
(Alfonsín, December 13th, 1983). 12 By describing the de facto laws in this way, there is a very
significant implication regarding respect for human rights. To only prosecute those who went
above and beyond what was asked of them by the de facto laws would be to disregard the
appalling nature of what the laws themselves called for. Although the crimes against humanity
committed by the military were at the time “legally” sanctioned, they still violated human rights
and the “dignity of man”, which, from the perspective of the UN Declaration, are inalienable and
inherent, and thus transcend any one nation, time frame, or legal framework.
Throughout this speech, Alfonsín reiterates how human rights, the rule of law, and
democracy are interconnected. In describing the new regime’s conception of democratic legal
order, he explains that “this conception makes compatible the plainest respect for the rights and
fundamental guarantees for human beings, with the firmness, zeal and efficiency in the
prevention of acts that violate these rights and assault the constitutional order that protects them”

“Sin embargo, esas leyes de facto eran de por si instrumentos represivos que no reconocían límites impuestos
por elementales principios del derecho penal liberal: sus penas, sobre todo la de muerte, eran draconianas, sus
tipos penales, imprecisos y abiertos, sus procedimientos, violatorios de elementales garantías.”
12
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(Alfonsín, December 13th, 1983). 13 Human rights, democracy, and justice are plainly united here.
The phrase “constitutional order” evokes images of an established collection of goals and rules
aligned with the democratic process. Referencing “the rights and fundamental guarantees for
human beings” refers back to the conceptualization that human rights are inalienable and
inherent, and truly one of the most deeply engrained aspect of humanity. A forward looking
perspective through the reference to “prevention of acts that violate these rights”, implies that
part of democracy’s responsibility to human rights is not only to see that justice is done to those
who have violated said rights, but to further ensure that such violations never reoccur. This is a
primary example of the new regime working to unite concepts of democracy to concepts of
human rights through the utilization of the rule of law.
Evidence indicates Alfonsín is appealing to an international audience as well as a
domestic one early on in his presidency. In order to “ensure the integral protection of human
rights”, the UN “Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Covenant on Economic and Social
Rights…and the Pact of San José, Costa Rica that establishes the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights” was sent to Congress to be ratified as quickly as
possible (Alfonsín, December 13th, 1983). He goes on to state that “Argentina must participate
jointly” with the international community to become a “guarantor of the protection of human
rights on [Argentine] soil” (Alfonsín, December 13th, 1983). The ramifications of pushing for the
approval of these international human rights instruments are significant: for one, by ratifying
internationally organized documents, there is an acknowledgement that the protection of human
rights is a transnational project, in that human rights transcends national borders. Additionally,

“Esa concepción hace compatibles el más pleno respecto de los derechos y garantías fundamentales de la
persona humana, con la firmeza, el celo y la eficacia en la prevención de actos violatorios de esos derechos y
atentatorios contra el orden constitucional que los ampara.”
13
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sending the documents to Congress to be ratified rather than declaring them approved as the
head of state exemplifies respect for the democratic process and the utilization of proper
democratic channels.
Alfonsín frequently alludes to the interconnectedness between truth, reconciliation, the
rule of law, and democracy in his speeches, particularly during the early phases of his
presidency. Upon receiving the completed report Nunca Más from the Truth and Reconciliation
Committee, CONADEP, the president spoke on what truth meant to Argentina’s national identity
moving forward: “This country…needed to know the truth about what happened, because we
cannot construct a national unity on the basis of lies or ignorance. Only on the basis of truth and
justice can we encounter reconciliation” (Alfonsín, September 20, 1984). 14 Truth and an accurate
portrayal of the nation’s recent history are foundational to Alfonsín’s conceptualization of
reconciliation. As Grandin (2005) explains, truth can partially serve to heal the psychological
damage of conflict by acknowledging the various experiences of repression and declaring them
the official history of the dictatorship (47). Such a process of truth telling not only serves as a
method of psychic healing, but is a symbol of the new regime rejecting everything to do with its
authoritarian predecessor, including its version of historical events. Both of these phenomena
help to contribute to the process of reconciliation particularly in its ability to “honestly and
directly address the root causes of conflict” (Clark 2009, 194). The rejection of the dictatorship

“El país…necesitaba saber la verdad acerca de lo que pasó, porque sobre la base de la mentira o de la
oscuridad no podemos construir la unión nacional. Solamente sobre la base de la verdad y de la justicia es que
podemos encontrarnos en la reconciliación tomados—por qué no—de la mano de la bondad.” Note here that
oscuridad most directly translates to darkness. However, it makes more contextual sense here in referring to the
state of being kept in the dark, thus the use of the word ignorance in the translation above.
14
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and assertion of democratic rule is a trademark aspect of Alfonsín’s presidential rhetoric, as is
evident from the speeches analyzed so far.
Under Alfonsín, truth was the first step necessary to enacting justice through the rule of
law, as can be seen from other sections of his speech upon receiving the Nunca Más report. Once
the truth is found and made known, justice can be achieved; it is through the rule of law,
however that procedural, democratic justice that is achieved, and not through vengeance: “Justice
is going to act as it should in Argentina, through due process and within the framework of the
rule of law” (Alfonsín, September 20, 1984). Once again, the rule of law is hailed as integral not
only to the future of democracy, but to the future of human rights as well. On a speech regarding
the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights, Alfonsín conceived of the rule of law having
been fully achieved “when all can live a dignified life, when men can freely choose their path
because the state has made sure that they have the means, the education and the health necessary
to do so” (Alfonsín, October 4, 1984). Referring to education and health both being human rights
as well is demonstrative of Argentina taking steps towards a forward looking, positive
conceptualization of human rights. In this way, Alfonsín goes beyond merely a negative of
framework of human rights (e.g. right to not be tortured) and instead incorporates a positive
framework (e.g. right to have education). This allusion to the rule of law as a reflection of the
respect of human rights also helps to connect democracy and human rights once again: if the rule
of law is a pillar of democracy, and the rule of law is where human rights are respected, then a
pillar of democracy is the respect for human rights. Collectively, this is all reflective of the
highly judicialized framework of human rights under democracy that begins to take hold in
Argentina under Alfonsín.
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In a continued effort to reinforce the judicialized and procedural view of human rights
and democracy, Alfonsín also frequently refers to the principle of legitimacy. In this framework,
legitimacy is attained through respecting the inherent dignity of human beings: “It is only
through enhancing the dignity of a human person that a government can fully justify exercising
its power. When…the fundamental rights of man are tragically violated in a systematic way, a
government loses legitimacy” (Alfonsín, October 4, 1984). As described here, legitimacy can
only be attained when a government acts with an underlying respect for human rights. Thus, as a
fundamental property of Argentine democracy is its respect for human rights, it governs its
citizens legitimately.
The drive to create a legitimate democracy that respects human rights is also not a solely
Argentine directive for Alfonsín. The rhetoric of the transitional regime is aware of the
international impact that its transitional choices have, both in serving as a trailblazer for other
nations as well as contributing to the transnational protection of universal human rights. Much of
Alfonsín’s rhetoric within the transitional regime describes his ethic in which “men, solely for
being men, deserve to be treated with dignity and respect” (Alfonsín, October 4, 1984). 15
Alfonsín views Argentina’s dedication to human rights as part of a transnational effort of
promoting “the full validity of human rights, which is only imaginable when the borders of
different nations are crossed, and respect and peace are thought of as universal” (Alfonsín,
October 4, 1984). There is an awareness in this rhetoric that what Argentina does has
international implications for how the rest of the world may view and treat human rights, both
within the confines of nations and across international borders. Furthermore, Argentina serves as

The word “men” is a direct translation from the word “hombres”. This is in no way focusing on male-identifying
individuals in either language, but is rather a reference to “mankind”, which is another way of translating
“hombres”. However, the choice of “men” makes more sense in the English version above.
15
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the litmus test for the establishment of democratic norms and respect for human rights for the
Latin American region. From this perspective, Argentina is aware of the standard it is setting
through its transition processes.
One of the most central aspects of Alfonsín’s rhetoric is the emphasis on democracy
being extremely participatory phenomena. Frequently throughout his speeches, Alfonsín reminds
the Argentine public that true, functioning democracy depends primarily on the ability of the
citizenry to participate in the democratic process and make their voices heard. This becomes an
especially prominent point towards the end of his presidency and in the passing of the Full Stop
and Due Obedience laws. The Full Stop law, passed in 1985, imposed a two month time limit on
law suits brought against the military for human rights violations during the dictatorship, after
which a statute of limitations would prevent any further judicial action; 16 the Due Obedience
law, passed two years later in response to an extremely tense, attempted military mutinee, stated
that anyone of a certain rank or below could not have a lawsuit filed against them for
perpetrating human rights violations during the dictatorship as they were simply following orders
(Romero 2002, 263). Neither law was popular with Argentine citizens in any sector of society,
reflective of how belief in justice through the rule of law and the avoidance of impunity as
fundamental to democracy and human rights had already established themselves as fundamental
principles in the Argentine imagination.
The emphasis on participation from the regime’s end can thus be interpreted as a
reinforcement of these norms in an attempt to ensure that once the military became less of an
imminent threat, there would once again be a push for legal action against the dictatorship’s

16

It should be noted that the intention of the Full Stop law was to stem the flow of cases against the military.
However, it had the unintended effect of increasing the number of subpoenas and lawsuits as civil society made a
mad dash to file their cases before the deadline.
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perpetrators. This is especially evident in Alfonsin’s reiteration that democracy is far more than
the inner workings of institutions and the work of politicians: “Living in democracy requires
admitting that the country of today is the result of the actions or omissions of all citizens and that
the well-being desired for the future can only be achieved by the joint effort of all of them”
(Alfonsín, June 27, 1984). There are frequent reminders of this nature through Alfonsin’s later
speeches, insinuating that in order to achieve certain democratic outcomes, civil society must
continue to call for action and push their government to act as instructed by the governed. As
early as the eve of the first year of democracy, Alfonsín stated that Argentina’s new democracy
wants to govern with public opinion that “supports ideas, participates, questions acts of
government, criticizes harshly and makes suggestions” (Alfonsín, December 17, 1984). A highly
participatory model of democracy is important in ensuring that norms for the democratic process
and democratic accountability are upheld going forward, even though certain political
concessions such as the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws may serve as momentary obstacles in
achieving certain transitional justice goals.
Additionally, as a final measure, Alfonsín calls on Argentines to continue to have faith in
the democratic process, in part because there still remains strong memories of what life is like
when democracy is forgotten and cast aside. Threats of a military coup and refusal to cooperate
from the Armed Forces remained a constant point of contention during the transitional regime.
Especially given the judicialized transitional justice mechanisms implemented (such as repealing
the amnesty law, creating the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and taking the junta leaders
to trial), there was concern that there was a higher chance of a military takeover in retaliation that
would destroy the beginnings of democratic rule (Sikkink and Walling 2007, 428). However,
Alfonsín argues that Argentina was able to disprove this political theory by demonstrating that
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not only was democracy superior to authoritarianism, but it was additionally able to “heal the
wounds” that it had left behind (Alfonsín, October 30, 1985). Taking this into consideration,
Alfonsín asks the transitional regime and society to continue to have faith in what democracy is
capable of in order to keep its spirit alive in troubling times: “I know that faith is not sufficient,
but I also know, just as much as you all, that nothing can be built without faith” (Alfonsín,
December 17, 1984). Alfonsín asks the people of Argentina to continue to have faith in
democratic principles and democracy’s ability to uphold human rights through justice given
everyone participates in upholding these norms; by combining the norm of democracy as
participatory with the insistence that democratic process will regain strength based on the
continued adherence to democratic principles, the end of the transitional government solidified
the possibility that certain transitional justice mechanisms could be implemented later.

CONADEP’s Truth and Reconciliation Report
In the first several days of his presidency, Raúl Alfonsín commissioned the creation of
Argentina’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, known by its acronym CONADEP
(Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, or the National Commission on the
Disappearance of Persons). The establishment of CONADEP was a reflection of Alfonsín’s
commitment to truth as “a necessary precondition to justice and reconciliation” (Wright 2007,
143). CONADEP was by no means created with the intention of castigating any specific military
members; that would be the goal of the trials against the military juntas, demonstrative of the
newfound dedication to the rule of law in Argentina. Rather, CONADEP was commissioned
with the intention of reflecting the new regime’s dedication to principles of democracy and deepseated belief in truth as a precondition to justice, and justice an essential prerequisite to
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reconciliation as it had been conceptualized through a legal framework. The dedication to
democracy is reflected in the very nature of what the commission sought out to do: create a
historical truth of the dictatorship based on civilian testimonials. This act of going to the
citizenry to create a narrative of the true horrors that occurred under direct orders of the
dictatorship and speaking out against the history constructed by the military 17 demonstrated the
dedication the new regime had to upholding the most basic principles of democracy, namely, to
create a government that was reflective of the people. Truth is similarly held in high regard as
evidenced by the very creation by the commission. Seeing as one of the earliest steps taken by
the new regime was to organize a group solely dedicated to rewriting history and exposing the
details of the dictatorship as seen through the eyes of the citizenry, it is clear that truth was at the
forefront of the new democracy’s mind in terms of norms it associated with democracy and
justice.
The commission was given only 180 days to complete its task of collecting victim
testimony and investigating the sites of former detention centers. In addition to this time
constraint, the commission was limited to looking at disappearances rather than all of the human
rights violations committed by the dictatorship, such as arbitrary detention, torture, rape, theft of
infants belonging to the detained, or extrajudicial execution that were not preceded by
disappearance (Wright 2007, 143). Additionally, CONADEP was not given subpoena powers,
reflecting Alfonsín’s tentativeness in regards to potentially provoking any rash retaliation on the
part of the military. However, besides the institutional limits placed on CONADEP, their

The military repeatedly argued that the crimes committed by the dictatorship were necessary in their “just
war” against “subversion” that threatened the civilized, Western, Christian way of life in Argentina (CONADEP
1984, 9).
17
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published report, Nunca Más, is a prime example of the power of rhetoric in reflecting and
further establishing certain norms.
The report’s audience is multifaceted. Within the confines of Argentina, the audience of
the report is threefold: the government, the military, and the general public. The government as
audience is reflected in the report’s suggestions for achieving reconciliation; the end of the report
lists out suggested transitional justice mechanisms that would be best for achieving justice, and
thus reconciliation. To the military, the creation of the report is a direct rejection of the military
dictatorship’s version of historical events, and thus a rejection of allowing any sort impunity.
Lastly, the Argentine public, is an extremely important audience for the report. The report itself
as a rhetorical act demonstrates the democratic regimes expressed dedication to discovering the
truth as constructed by the citizenry, but its contents also serve as a direct way to communicate
the norms that the regime intends to establish. Apart from the Argentine audience—and
something that is important to consider in context of the transnationalization and universalization
of human rights—is the international audience that Argentina’s new democratic regime is
simultaneously trying to reach.
The Nunca Más report is an exceedingly demonstrative example of the rhetorical and
discursive norms that Argentina was aiming to establish at the time of transition. A central idea
that the text engages with are the concepts of humanity and what it means to be human. When
referring to the individuals who suffered trauma at the hands of the dictatorship, the phrase “ ser
humano” or “human being” is used very frequently. They are not “víctimas”, “personas”, or
“gente”;18 they are more than people or citizens or byproducts of the human rights violations that
they experienced; nor are they subversives, as the dictatorship called them (Wright 2007, 141).
18

“Victims”, “persons”, or “people” respectively.
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Rather, they are full-fledged human beings, and thus deserving of human rights solely on that
basis. Although there are moments in which they are referred to as victims, they are not limited
this; they are more frequently described as humans and human beings. An example of the text’s
reiteration that these people were human can be seen in a rather poetic passage describing
situations frequently experienced by those who had their human rights stripped away:
From the moment of the kidnapping, the victim lost all of their rights; deprived of all
communication with the outside world, confined in places unknown, subjected to hellish
torments, ignorant of their mediate or immediate destiny, susceptible to being hurled into
the river or the sea, with blocks of cement on their feet, or reduced to ashes; beings that
were, however, not things, but rather retained attributes of the human creature [emphasis
added]: the sensitivity for the torture, the memory of their mother or of their child or of
their wife, the infinite shame for public rape; beings not only possessed by infinite anguish
and supreme fear, but rather, and perhaps for that very reason, guarding in some corner of
their soul some outlandish hope (CONADEP 1984, 9-10). 19

This passage makes it clear how important it was for CONADEP to rehumanize the victims of
human rights violations. Firstly, this was aimed at undoing the dehumanizing language utilized
by the dictatorship that portrayed the victims, or “subversives”, as a cancer or pest that needed to
be eradicated to preserve the wellbeing of the Argentine nation. Secondly, this humanizing
language worked to prevent the disappeared from becoming blank, unidentifiable bodies.
Throughout every stage of torment, the individuals in question remained human beings. This
serves to emphasize the true, horrifying nature of the human rights violations. Once the reader is
able to identify with the victim—through shared images such as memories of loved ones,
physical as well as emotional pain, and despite everything, fragments of hope—it becomes

“Desde el momento del secuestro, la víctima perdía todos los derechos; privada de toda comunicación con el
mundo exterior, confinada en lugares desconocidos, sometida a suplicios infernales, ignorante de su destino
mediato o inmediato, susceptible de ser arrojada al río o al mar, con bloques de cemento en sus pies, o reducida
a cenizas; seres que sin embargo no eran cosas, sino que conservaban atributos de la criatura humana: la
sensibilidad para el tormento, la memoria de su madre o de su hijo o de su mujer, la infinita vergüenza por la
violación en público; seres no sólo poseídos por esa infinita angustia y ese supremo pavor, sino, y quizás por
eso mismo, guardando en algún rincón de su alma alguna descabellada esperanza.”
19
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increasingly more difficult to separate the victim from a uniting sense of humanity. In turn, it
becomes increasingly more difficult to turn a blind eye to the fact that what was acted out under
the dictatorship was unequivocally senseless abuse of human rights.
In addition to reaffirming the humanity of those who suffered human rights abuses at the
hands of the military, the report makes it clear that the acts committed by the dictatorship were
the antithesis of humanity and human rights. At various points, the dictatorship and the crimes
enacted by it are described as wild, barbaric, brutal, and terroristic (CONADEP 1984, 7). This
relates back to the UN’s rhetorical argument that in order for a nation to be civilized, it must
respect human rights. The fact that the report would go so far as to describe the acts of the
dictatorship as those of “planned terror” that violated the constitution when the military had been
describing subversives as the true terrorist threat to the nation demonstrates how Argentina’s
new norms regarding human rights were so centrally focused on rejecting and flipping the
military’s historical narrative. For the new democratic regime, upholding human rights that there
would be no impunity under any circumstances, including in how history would be remembered.
The Nunca Más report also exemplifies and reaffirms how truth and justice are both
interconnected and fundamental principles of the new democracy and upholding human rights.
At the beginning of the report, the committee clarifies that they “are not moved by resentment
nor by the spirit of vengeance; [they] only ask for truth and justice…for there will be
reconciliation only after the repentance of the guilty and there is justice founded in truth”
(CONADEP 1984, 10).20 This is the clearest way in which the regime’s norms can be expressed:
without truth, there can be no justice, and without justice, there can be no reconciliation. No

“No estamos movidos por el resentimiento ni por el espíritu de venganza; solo pedimos la verdad y la
justicia…entendiendo que no podrá haber reconciliación sino después del arrepentimiento de los culpables y de
una justicia que se fundamente en la verdad.”
20
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steps can be skipped on the path to reconciliation. The understanding conveyed here is that
transitional justice and human rights rely on a rejection of impunity. This is also evident in
Alfonsín’s choice to bring military leaders to trial in front of a civilian tribunal after nullifying
the amnesty law.
Truth, and subsequently justice, as defined by CONADEP are also necessary for the
return and maintenance of democracy. The greatest task faced by the new democracy would be
to uncover the truth, “reencounter its past”, and let the civil community judge those who
committed crimes against humanity (CONADEP 1984, 443). It is only through confronting its
conflicted history, embracing the truth, regardless of how unpleasant it may be, and upholding
the rule of law by bringing the perpetrators to justice through the proper channels that the new
democracy will be legitimate. This is a continued effort to break with the past as well; in
rejecting impunity, there is simultaneously a rejection of the de facto rule that characterized the
dictatorship period.
The Commission states that through its investigation, it found that in every sector of
society there came a “demand for truth” (CONADEP 1984, 444). On a more personal level for
the members of the Commission, they found that uncovering the truth was more a reflection of
their civic duty rather than a requirement of their employment on the Commission (CONADEP
1984, 445). Speaking as democratic citizens, the need to uncover and reveal the truth is revealed
to be an integral part of the democratic experience according to the Commission. Thus, the idea
that democracy and exposure of the truth are linked becomes reinforced. Moreover, by referring
to the task of revealing the truth as a civic duty, it alludes to the idea that upholding human rights
is an inherent trait of democracy as well; to be a democratic citizen means exposing the truth to
achieve justice, and such justice will serve to uphold the integrity of human rights.
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Menem, N. Kirchner, and C. F. Kirchner
Due to the highly judicialized model of human rights and democracy that was established
during the primary stages of the democratic transition, it became imperative for Alfonsín to also
establish a concept of civil participation as the transitional regime began to face more pertinent
threats from the military. Through the establishment of lasting norms of faith in democracy’s
ability to utilize the rule of law to protect human rights and bring perpetrators to justice, the
transitional government was able to ensure that there would continue to be a commitment to truth
and justice. This would become evident in rhetoric used by future presidents and the policies
they enacted.
In the following discursive acts and policies undertaken by the following presidents, it
becomes clear how deeply impactful the rhetoric utilized by transitional government was at
founding the way that democracy and human rights were understood.
On May 14, 1989, Carlos Menem of the Peronist party was elected president. Although
the Constitution stated that he was to take office in December of that year, he was instead sworn
in two months after winning the election on July 8, 1989 when Alfonsín resigned to hasten the
transition of power (Romero 2002, 283). Menem’s presidency and rhetoric proved to be quite
different from that of his predecessor. His preference for forgiveness and leaving the past in the
past became apparent almost immediately during his inauguration, and would become even more
evident when he would grant presidential pardons to several hundred people accused of violating
human rights during the dictatorship. This included the military leaders of the authoritarian
regime who had been found guilty of their crimes in the famous Trial of the Juntas. Despite this
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being a near complete turnaround from everything that Alfonsín had advocated for, the political
acts and rhetoric that characterized Menem’s approach to democracy and human rights did not
undermine the impact made by the rhetoric and policies from the early transitional period. If
anything, by looking at the resurgence of these norms and ideas under Presidents Nestor
Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, Menem’s presidency and rhetoric instead
demonstrates the longevity and resilience of the rhetoric utilized during Alfonsín’s presidency.
From the very beginning, it is clear that President Menem had different
conceptualizations regarding how democracy was responsible for upholding human rights,
particularly in the definition of upholding human rights. Menem’s vision for reconciliation was
primarily entrenched in leaving the horrors of Argentina’s dictatorship in the past where it
belonged, and looking forward with the goal of recreating a sense of brotherhood between all
Argentines. In his inaugural address, he states: “The moment has arrived in which us Argentines
stop looking at each other like enemies and begin seeing each other as true brothers before God,
before the Fatherland and before this glorious people” (Menem, July 8, 1989). 21 He later goes on
to say, much more directly, that “[we Argentines] cannot once again make the mistake of living
in other eras and other times” (Menem, July 8, 1989). This is, rather directly, arguing
Argentina’s need to move past the gritty details of the dictatorship and start living in the present
if Argentina’s people and democracy are to develop. Menem urges the nation to reevaluate the
people they have viewed as perpetrators for so long, and instead reflect on them simply as fellow
countrymen; essentially, to forgive and forget. However, as Clark (2009) points out, forgiveness
is meant to be a form of agency for victims, who can ultimately decide whether to forgive their

21

The use of the word pueblo, or as it is translated above as people, is often difficult to communicate properly in the
English language. Pueblo can mean people, community, town, or nation among many others. The complexity of this
term should be taken into account when reading the above statement.
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perpetrators (202). Menem’s image of reconciliation as based on coerced forgiveness and a
preference to leave the past behind does not match with Alfonsín’s definition of reconciliation.
Alfonsín’s definition of reconciliation argues that it is an “incessant dialogue between
Argentines”, otherwise it is “nothing more than an easy forgetting” (Alfonsín, December 17,
1984). While Alfonsín’s definition of reconciliation promotes constant discussion and reflection
on the truths of the past, Menem’s definition promotes impunity, the very antithesis of
democracy and human rights proposed during the early transitional period. As the theory on
transitional democracy suggests, it follows that Alfonsín’s rhetoric and ideas would prove more
enduring, due to the importance of and legacy set by the transitional government (Smith 2012,
46).
Menem reaffirms his definition of reconciliation again in his comments on the decision to
pardon the dictatorship’s leaders: the minds behind the most egregious acts of the authoritarian
regime. Menem argues that the pardons are necessary for achieving national reconciliation and
strengthening Argentina’s democracy, stating that “Argentina lived through a dirty war, but the
war is over. The pardons will definitively close a sad and black stage of Argentine history” (qtd.
in Marx 1990). This desire to bring the anger of the dictatorship to a close is also evident in his
address to Congress upon his inauguration: “The hour…of pacification, of love, of patriotism has
arrived. After six years of democratic life, we have not managed to overcome the cruel
confrontations that divided us more than a decade ago” (Menem, July 8, 1989). In this statement
there is an implied association between democracy and the ability to overcome differences and
reconcile. Although does prove to be a connection to the rhetoric utilized by Alfonsín in the early
moments of the transition by uniting reconciliation to democracy, it is weak and distant. While
Alfonsín’s rhetoric implies that democracy brings about reconciliation via the rule of law,
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justice, and thus a respect for and ability to protect human rights, Menem’s perspective is clearly
that of an assumption concerning democracy’s ability to pacify and unite a divided populace.
It should also be noted that the pardons granted by Menem to high ranking members of
the military were still not considered sufficient for the Armed Forces. As Huser (2002) describes
it, “Pardon was not vindication…[Much of the military] felt that their institutions had done
nothing wrong and that neither persecution nor forgiveness was right” (127). The issue of a
slighted military remained; granting pardons still rhetorically implied that a crime had been
committed of which the perpetrators should be absolved. This was evident in continued military
unrest and attempted uprisings during Menem’s presidency (Huser 2002, 128). From this
perspective, the democratic regime under Menem was still acknowledging that crimes had in fact
been committed by the military dictatorship, with pardoning differing significantly from
exoneration; however, the act of pardoning them effectively declared the crimes forgivable, a
definitive break with Argentina’s earlier conceptualization of human rights as inalienable and
inviolable.
It is under President Nestor Kirchner’s presidency that the lasting impact of the early
transition’s rhetoric becomes more readily observable. Upon assuming the position of the
presidency in 2003, it became immediately clear that President Kirchner adhered to Alfonsín’s
principles of eradicating impunity and democracy’s responsibility to uphold respect for human
rights by instituting justice via the rule of law. In his inaugural speech, Kirchner proclaims,
“Governability is not nor can it be synonymous with impunity. Governability is not nor can it be
synonymous with shady agreements, political manipulation of institutions or spurious pacts
behind the backs of society” (Kirchner, May 25, 2003). Kirchner repeats many times throughout
his speech that Argentina under his leadership will be unequivocally against impunity in all its
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forms, as “legal security should be for all, not only for those with power or money” (Kirchner,
May 25, 2003). He also reiterates that “social peace, respect of the law, defense of life and
dignity are inalienable rights of all Argentines” (Kirchner, May 25, 2003). By describing these
laws as inalienable, referring to the dignity of man, and respect for the law, Kirchner is drawing
on the norms established by the transitional government of Alfonsín. From his first rhetorical act
directed at the Argentine state and citizenry, Kirchner restates the norms established during the
early years of Alfonsín’s presidency: impunity in all forms is unacceptable, and Argentina must
abide by the rule of law. He goes so far as to say that the fight against corruption and impunity
serves to strengthen democratic institutions on the basis of “eliminating all possible suspicion” of
them (Kirchner, May 25, 2003). In this way, Kirchner goes a step beyond declaring impunity as
the antithesis of democracy and legitimacy; in addition, the fight against impunity to confront it
in any situation in which it arises serves to reinforce faith in democratic principles and
institutions. This proactive perspective on fighting impunity becomes evident in Kirchner’s push
to annul the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws, political embodiments of impunity.
One of the first political moves of Kirchner’s presidency was the annulment of the
prohibition on the extradition of various perpetrators (Roehrig 2009, 737). There was concern
that this may pose a threat to Argentine sovereignty as it could reflect on an inability or
weakness of Argentina’s legal institutions. However, allowing for extradition served another
purpose for Kirchner’s dedication to doing away with impunity—annulling the Due Obedience
and Full Stop laws. In reference to allowing extradition, Kirchner states, “If the norms that
generated impunity disappear, [the military members] can be tried in Argentina” (qtd. in El Día,
July 31, 2003). The decision to open up extradition as a possibility for the military perpetrators
had a dual purpose: not only did it serve as a potential catalyst for annulling the Due Obedience
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and Full Stop laws, but it additionally signified an acknowledgement that human rights were in
fact universal and unconfined to national borders. By allowing for the crimes against humanity
committed during the dictatorship to be prosecuted in a different country, there is an implicit
recognition that human rights transcend borders and ensuring perpetrators are brought to justice
is a transnational goal, as is evident in Alfonsín’s rhetoric during the earliest stages of the
transition.
Kirchner also called for the resignation of many high ranking military officers by
appointing junior officer Roberto Bendini to Army Chief of Staff. As is custom in the Argentine
Army, when an individual is appointed to this post, “all officers above that rank that are
bypassed for promotion are expected to retire” (Roehrig 2009, 737). Again, this political act
served a dual purpose for Kirchner. First, by getting high ranking military officers to retire based
on custom, there was less of a direct threat to military sovereignty while still establishing civilian
control over the military; second, by having many military officials who still believed in the
dictatorship’s version of history removed from their posts, these officials were held accountable
for their refusal to ascribe to the official, democratic truth.
President Kirchner pushed repeatedly to have the Full Stop and Due Obedience laws
repealed, but ultimately left this to the Supreme Courts to make the final decision on their
legality. Showing his support for the annulment of the laws was demonstrative of his rhetoric
espousing the importance of eliminating impunity in Argentina, but allowing the Supreme Courts
to make the final rulings on the amnesty laws was a demonstration of his respect for the
democratic process. On June 14, 2005, the Supreme Court found both laws to be unconstitutional
by referring to a principle of international law originating during the time of the Nuremberg
Trials, stating that there could be no statute of limitations on human rights violations, nor can
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such offenses be pardoned (Roehrig 2009, 738). Referring to international law dating back to the
Nuremberg Trials further serves to demonstrate the respect for human rights law as a
transnational principle in democratic Argentina. In response to revoking these laws, Kirchner
responded that the Supreme Court had “given [Argentina] a ruling that renews [the people’s]
faith in the system of justice. They have declared unconstitutional [laws] that filled [Argentina]
with shame” (Roehrig 2009, 739). This harkens back to Alfonsín’s statement on having faith in
democracy and the rule of law’s ability to uphold respect for human rights. Specifically, by
saying that faith in justice was renewed rather than restored implies that it never fully
deteriorated, but the annulling of the two amnesty laws allowed for a resurgence in dedication to
utilizing the rule of law in democratic Argentina. In response to the removal of these two laws,
various new cases were brought to trial. This moment is especially significant in such that it
demonstrates the enduring nature of transitional justice mechanisms, especially when a nation
and a regime have faith in the rule of law. Though many transitional justice scholars believe that
transitional justice mechanisms must happen immediately during the transition if they are to
happen at all, Argentina proves otherwise (Sikkink and Walling 2007, 428). On the contrary,
belief in the long standing ability of democracy and the rule of law to protect human rights and
bring perpetrators to justice allowed Argentina to continue its transitional justice processes long
after transition had begun and even after the consolidation of democracy.
Beyond the Due Obedience and Full Stop laws, undoing the pardons granted by Menem
served as another aspect of undoing impunity in Kirchner’s Argentina. Much of Argentina’s civil
society called for the executive branch to use its power to undo the pardons, but Kirchner
responded in a way that once again demonstrated his dedication to upholding the rules of the
democratic process: “It is up to the courts. That’s the road it should take” (Roehrig 2009, 741).
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Although he made his opinion on the matter clear and in accordance with his perspective on
extinguishing impunity in Argentina, he remained steadfast to allowing the democratic process to
take its course and allow the Supreme Court to make the final decision on the matter. While the
Supreme Court began to undo each pardon case by case, a federal appeals case officially
overturned the pardons granted to the junta leaders, stating that pardons went against the
international human rights treaties that Argentina had ratified since the transition (Roehrig 2009,
742). Kirchner had declared the pardons “unconstitutional” in his opinion, but still insisted on the
ultimate decision being within the “definitive jurisdiction” of the Supreme Court (qtd. in Obarrio
2006). This adherence to the democratic process while still demonstrating dedication to undoing
Argentina’s history of impunity is demonstrative of the lasting impacts of the norms established
during the transitional period.
Another rhetorical aspect that Kirchner adds to the preexisting narrative is that of
memory. In his inauguration speech, Kirchner states: “We go forward without rancor, but with
memory. Memory not only of the errors and horrors of the other, but also memory of our own
equivocations” (Kirchner, May 25, 2003). This statement is referring not only to the errors of the
dictatorship in committing grave transgressions against human rights, but also to the errors
committed by the new democracy in its attempt to ignore and abandon the memories and truth of
the past. This is especially relevant in coming from Menem’s presidency, where the regime’s
rhetoric was clearly oriented towards forgiving and forgetting in order to achieve reconciliation.
This framing of ignoring the past as erroneous is apparent again in Kirchner’s opening of the
Museum of Memory in March of 2004: “I come to ask for forgiveness on behalf of the national
State for the shame of having kept silent for 20 years of democracy in regards to so many
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atrocities” (Kirchner, March 24, 2004).22 To further demonstrate his regret at the state remaining
silent in regards to truly acknowledging the atrocities committed by the dictatorship, Kirchner
states that the perpetrators have “only one name: they are murderers repudiated by the Argentine
people” (Kirchner, March 24, 2004). This bold rhetorical act of calling the military perpetrators
“murderers” harkens back to Alfonsín referring to the crimes against humanity as barbaric and
terroristic. By making this strong statement about the military perpetrators, both Kirchner and
Alfonsín solidly align the democratic regime with both acknowledgement and rejection of those
who committed such atrocities. The creation of the Museum of Memory itself is a powerful
rhetorical act; Kirchner had the Navy Mechanics School turned into a memorial site to remember
the disappeared victims and keep them in that national memory (Roehrig 2009, 737). The act of
transforming a space formerly utilized to train military officials as well as detain and torture
human beings into a site of remembrance gives the space an additional level of meaning: much
as the space was transformed from one of violence and impunity into one of truth, recognition,
and memory, so was the nation of Argentina.
Following Nestor Kirchner’s single term in office, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was
elected the next president of Argentina. 23 Fernández de Kirchner’s rhetoric concerning human
rights and democracy reflects that of Nestor Kirchner and Alfonsín, in that it operates on a
conceptualization of the two as judicially united and highly participatory. Beginning with her
inaugural speech, the rhetorical patterns produced in the transitional government and reproduced
by the most recent administration are immediately traceable. The judicialized conceptualization

“Vengo a pedir perdón de parte del Estado nacional por la vergüenza de haber callado durante 20 años de
democracia por tantas atrocidades”
23 Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, former wife and current widow of Nestor Kirchner, was first lady during her
husband’s term in office. Though it is expected that there would be skepticism about a president’s wife being his
successor, the elections were fair and open and her run for office was not prohibited.
22
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of democracy and human rights’ overlap is observed in her statements on eradicating impunity in
Argentina: “I believe that… the Executive Branch, the Legislative Branch, and also the Supreme
Court of Justice…have finally demolished the wall of impunity [through] the annulment of the
laws of Due Obedience, Full Stop, and the Pardons…We have contributed to the construction of
the democratic system” (Fernández de Kirchner, December 10, 2007). A clear connection is
made between the ability for the democratic process and democratic principles to do away with
impunity. Alfonsín and Nestor Kirchner’s rhetoric make this same connection, once again
demonstrating the enduring ability of norms and beliefs established during the transition and
beyond.
Furthermore, by using the subject “we”, there is again a rhetorical reference to the norm
of democracy being highly participatory. In this way, there is a reaffirmation that true Argentine
democracy relies on the engagement of every individual member of the nation. Fernández de
Kirchner makes this belief even more clear when she says, “You cannot change a country only
with good government in its three branches. To change a country requires a good government
and a good society, where every citizen knows that every day when he makes decisions, he is
also constructing the societal model in which he wants to live” (Fernández de Kirchner,
December 10, 2007). Rhetorical support for civil participation as critical to the democratic
process harkens back to Alfonsín’s own inaugural speech in which he states that Argentina
cannot rely on “enlightened leaders” and that each person is responsible for making the country
they deserve. Fernández de Kirchner’s statement demonstrates a belief that every act or
“decision” of democratic citizens can be political ones, again reflecting the ideas from Alfonsín’s
rhetoric that argued democracy was a way of life in addition to a form of government.
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Within her policy proposals, these early rhetorical patterns are evident in her goal of
strengthening Argentina’s democratic institutions: “I sincerely believe that we have come a long
way in these years of democracy and I hope to deepen the role of Congress, where we can
discuss and debate…without grievances, with alternative and viable proposals” (Fernández de
Kirchner, December 10, 2007). Adherence to the democratic process and the rule of law inherent
to it is a central aspect of this statement. The democratic process as conceived by Kirchner and
her predecessors involves open discussion and debate. Reflective also in the above statement is
belief that democracy has in fact been developing and has “come a long way” since the transition
period. One can infer that based on this statement, Fernández de Kirchner demonstrates a faith in
the norms of democracy that she is reproducing.
Fernández de Kirchner’s rhetoric regarding human rights is also reflective of the norms
and beliefs that were produced by Alfonsín and then reestablished under Nestor Kirchner. As
mentioned in an earlier quote, Fernández de Kirchner argues that by annulling the Due
Obedience law, the Full Stop law, and the presidential pardons for military perpetrators, the
democratic governance has made an impressive step in the pursuit of abolishing impunity.
Additionally, the act of annulling these acts has contributed to the “construction of the
democratic system” (Fernández de Kirchner, December 10, 2007). The fact that these laws were
annulled does not only bolster the strength of democratic norms via proper democratic channels;
it also serves to strengthen democracy by upholding human rights norms. As earlier rhetoric
demonstrates, there is a clear, judicialized link between human rights and democracy. Fernández
de Kirchner reaffirms this rhetorical link when stating that the annulment of these laws, which
stood in the way of respect for human rights, helped maintain democracy. Put simply, the
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annulment of the amnesty laws was a testament to the deep connection between democracy and
human rights that Argentina repeatedly aimed to establish.
Fernández de Kirchner also states her desire to continue with the transitional justice
mechanisms that were initiated during the transition. In her inaugural address, she asserts that all
branches of government have the obligation to “prosecute and punish those who were
responsible for the greatest genocide in our history” (Fernández de Kirchner, December 10,
2007). She explicitly mentions that she wants to reinitiate the human rights trials and see them
through to the end. The rhetoric here is very reflective of a perspective on justice as being
retributive and based in the rule of law and procedure. There is also something important to note
here; by calling the dictatorship genocide instead of a period of terrorism or conflict as other
presidents had in the past, there is a reassertion of Argentina’s willingness to recognize and
acknowledge human rights violations for what they are, harkening back to Alfonsín’s rhetoric
establishing truth as a necessary mechanism for democracy and human rights.
Fernández de Kirchner’s rhetoric reaffirming norms of human rights and democracy is
especially evident in her speech given on the Universal Day of Human Rights. She states that the
Argentina that has been collectively built since the transition “[Argentines] have built together,
respecting memory, truth and justice…I’m not going to tire of repeating that human rights are
neither left nor right; they are simply…human rights, those that distinguish the human condition
and those that make us respect the life and personal and moral integrity of every citizen”
(Fernández de Kirchner, December 10, 2010).24 This sole statement contains many of the norms

“[Los Argentinos han] construido entre todos, respetando la memoria, la verdad y la justicia…Y yo no me voy a
cansar de reptiri que los derechos human os no son ni de izquierda ni de derecha; son simplemente…los derechos
humanos, los que distinguen a la condición humana y los que no hacen respetar la vida y la integridad personal y
moral de cada ciudadano.”
24
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and ideologies that were established during the transition: the Argentina that respects the
inherent dignity of human beings through memory, truth, and justice was developed collectively
by every individual’s adherence to norms and beliefs regarding the symbiotic relationship
between democracy and human rights. All of the conceptualizations that were so prominent
during the transitional government become reasserted here in a single statement.
Pride for a nation that respects democratic processes and the rule of law in regards to
transitional justice and human rights is also evident in another statement of Fernández de
Kirchner’s. She states that civil societies call for due process rather than revenge in regards to the
dictatorship’s human rights violations “redoubles [her] conviction that this is the true democratic,
libertarian and equal path that a society that calls itself civilized must have to achieve justice”
(Fernández de Kirchner, December 10, 2010). The president declares in this statement that
Argentina has proven that judicialized conceptualizations of human rights and democracy, as
well as respect for the rule of law, is the only way to achieve justice. Such a statement reconfirms
that the norms that have been reproduced throughout the transition and consolidation are central
to how Argentina should imagine its future.
The president also argues for why the continuation of certain transitional justice
mechanisms, specifically human rights trials, are important even after so much time has passed
since the dictatorship: “We owe it to those who victims; we owe it to their families…we owe it
to the survivors that cannot continue to be subjected to the torture of the permanent story of the
tragedy” (Fernández de Kirchner, December 10, 2010). Fernández de Kirchner invokes a sense
of civic duty as democratic citizens to continue with these transitional justice mechanisms. This
statement also argues that in order for survivors to completely regain their dignity, action must
be taken so that the story of Argentina’s recent history is one in which a nation rose up against
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impunity and brought perpetrators to justice for the sake of human rights and democracy;
Argentina’s story can no longer remain one of unfinished business wherein victims, survivors,
and their families are mere reminders of tragedy that went unresolved.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As the preexisting literature demonstrated, gaps in the current scholarship prevented a
fuller understanding of the ways in which transitional justice and transitional democracy overlap,
and more importantly, the way nations and citizens think about them. While institutional strength
should still be considered a significant aspect of the way democratic regimes—both in their
transitional stages and after consolidation—should be evaluated, the way that democracy and
human rights are conceptualized by a nation provide an extra layer of understanding. Particularly
in the case of Argentina, it is clear that a more complete picture of the way ideas and definitions
democracy and human rights have been produced and reproduced comes from rhetorical analysis
as well as institutional evaluation. As the analysis above has shown, certain rhetorical
frameworks and patterns have persisted within the Argentine conceptualization of democratic
and human rights principles since the onset of the transition.
There are many common rhetorical patterns that can be found starting in the transitional
period and going forward. As theorized in the methods section, there were five specific
conceptualizations that this thesis sought to analyze: humanity, justice, rights, democracy, and
truth. The purpose of this analysis was to see how each of these principles were thought of in
relation to each other within the context of Argentina’s period of transitional justice and
transitional democracy. Through a process of “rhetorical carbon dating” by which these
discursive patterns are traced across time, certain trends are found in the way that Argentina’s
regime produced and reproduced certain norms regarding the overlap between democratic norms
and respect for human rights. Particularly in the case of Argentina since its 1983 transition, the
interplay between democratic responsibility and human rights has been highly judicialized. It is
primarily through rhetoric of the rule of law that these principles have been united and
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judicialized, and indeed each of the five original terms fits into this complex web of ideology in
this way.
It should be taken into account that democracy and human rights, while similar in some
principles, are not inherently tied to one another. As Evans (2001) explains, “Although the
imagery of democracy has achieved a high profile in global and international politics in recent
years, the discussion here points to a political rationale that has little to do with achieving the
conditions for protecting and promoting human rights” (639). Taking this into consideration, it
should primarily be acknowledged that Argentina’s ability to unite democracy and human rights
through rhetorical norms is not something to be overlooked or considered expected; the proactive
uniting of the two concepts is something that must actively be strived for. Not only is this
significant for domestic understandings of the relationship between democracy and human rights,
but it is also important in how it contributed to the transnational conversation on human rights.
Conceptualizations of humanity fit clearly into Argentina’s framework of the judicialized
notion of democracy’s responsibility to human rights. Frequently throughout Alfonsín’s rhetoric,
there are many references to the inherent dignity of man, which ensures certain rights and
guarantees solely on the basis of being human. Rhetoric of humanity is not typically judicialized
in a traditional, courtroom sense of legality, but is rather as a law of nature that is inherent to the
individual beyond the confines of man-made positive laws. As the rhetorical analysis section has
demonstrated, Kirchner and Alfonsín’s rhetoric often points to the critical responsibility
democracy has in protecting the rights that are ingrained in humanity. This responsibility in
judicialized in two ways: first, by castigating human rights violations and utilizing the rule of law
to enact legitimate forms of retribution; and second, by implementing the rule of law to ensure
human rights are upheld in the proactive rather than reactive sense.
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Truth and justice as transitional justice mechanisms are also judicialized in Argentine
rhetoric. Justice is repeatedly framed as a necessary step on the path to reconciliation. It is
through retributive justice, constructed and implemented by the rule of law, that a democracy
that is able to take action to protect human rights consistently and legitimately. Retributive
justice is additionally linked to eventual reconciliation, the belief being that rejecting impunity in
favor of accountability will bring peace of mind to victims and dissuade any future perpetrators.
Truth and justice are typically entwined with one another. Truth is seen as a precursor to justice;
it is uncovering of the truth that sheds light on the appropriate measures of justice. Truth is also
thought of as foundational to the development of democracy and democratic unity. It is only
through being honest with all aspects of its past that a democracy is able to attain legitimacy.
When working in tandem, truth and justice both contribute to reconciliation by being
foundational to both democracy’s ability to uphold human rights in a judicialized context.
Rights are conceptualized in two different ways related to the judicialized relationship
between human rights and democracy. Reflecting back on concepts of humanity, certain rights
are theorized to be inherent and inviolable to each human being. Within Argentina specifically,
these inviolable rights innate in every human being include rights to life, liberty, living a
dignified life, and the freedom to choose one’s own path in life (Alfonsín, October 4, 1984).
Considering this perspective of basic human rights, democracy is expected to provide certain
means to achieve these rights that are afforded human beings. Additionally, democratic rights
can be seen as freedom of association and expression. Through Argentine rhetoric, it is clear that
both being a democratic citizen and being a human being come with their own sets of implicit
rights, though many of these rights are similar. It is through these overlapping sets of rights that
democracy and human rights are joined together in Argentine rhetoric.
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Democracy is interwoven with the other principles of humanity, justice, truth, and rights;
its understanding in the Argentine imaginary is crucial to interpreting democracy’s responsibility
to human rights. Throughout much of the rhetoric implemented during the transitional period and
beyond, democracy is depicted as a highly participatory process. Democracy is also
conceptualized as characterizing all aspects of post-authoritarian life in Argentina, extending to
the home and the school as well as to the official political arena. The discursive connection
between rule of law and democracy is very strong in Argentina’s transitional rhetoric; the rule of
law is perceived as a central pillar of democratic governance, as it is through the rule of law that
legitimacy is gained in a democratic regime. At the same time, the rule of law within Argentine
rhetoric is described as being the process by which the rights inherent to human beings are fully
respected. In this way, proactive and reactive rules and measures taken to ensure the
establishment of human rights norms are fundamental to the foundation of democracy.
By doing rhetorical carbon dating on all of these discursive concepts, my analysis is able
to demonstrate how democratic responsibility to upholding human rights was constructed in
post-authoritarian Argentina. The repeated construction and reassertion of the relationship
between democracy and human rights framed the use of particular transitional justice
mechanisms rather than others in the wake of Argentina’s repressive dictatorship. The
relationship between democratic responsibility and human rights was fundamentally judicialized,
which was then reflected in the conceptualization of reconciliation. Within this rhetorical
framework, reconciliation became a reflection of the judicial processes such as the trial of the
juntas, the annulation of the various amnesty laws, and declaring presidential pardons as
unconstitutional. The publication of the Truth and Reconciliation Report Nunca Más and the
creation of the Museum of Memory were not as directly judicial as the other transitional justice
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mechanisms, but they still reflected judicialized principles evident on the rhetoric regarding
impunity; as impunity is a significant blockade to the proper functioning of a democracy that
respects human rights, it is the assertion of truth and the memorialization of this truth that puts a
stop to this impunity and instead brings about accountability. These conceptualizations,
established during the early stages of the transition, established a pattern in the way Argentina
understood and conceived of democracy and human rights across time. As is evident from the
second president’s attempt to reinstate impunity and forgetting, the judicialized conception of
democracy’s responsibility to human rights formulated during the transition period were strong
enough to last well past the point of consolidation and affect related policy and rhetoric in the
modern era.
Argentina’s rhetoric regarding the overlap between human rights and democracy
demonstrates the dynamic relationship and understanding of these two principles. The rhetoric
established during the transition has been developed and reapplied to debates on human rights
beyond the limits of transitional justice. Much of the rhetoric used by recent presidents focusing
on human rights and democracy has shifted its focus to elements of social justice, such as
education and health care. One recent policy in particular that has been framed using rhetoric of
justice and human rights has been the legalization of same-sex marriage during President
Fernández de Kirchner’s term in office. Though similar patterns of rhetoric appeared in the
framing of this law, it represented a shift towards a more positive view of human rights rather
than a solely reactionary one. The way that the passing of this law has been framed as a
fundamental step in respecting human rights demonstrates both how human rights and the way
they are understood is dynamic, and that Latin America is contributing to these constantly
evolving conceptions.
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Chile would be another significant place to look to demonstrate the variability in how
nations understand and conceive of the relationship between human rights and democracy.
Chile’s dictatorship and transition was similar to Argentina’s, but differed in important ways.
Besides the point in time at which Chile transitioned, 25 Chile’s mode of transition—a
plebiscite—and their choice in transitional justice processes differed. Still, the human rights
violations committed by the Chilean dictatorship were extremely similar to those occurring at the
same time in Argentina, and the ultimate goals of achieving reconciliation and democratic
consolidation were the same in both countries. However, as a preliminary look at Chile’s
transitional rhetoric would suggest, the understanding of the way democracy and human rights
overlap differs; an introductory glance would suggest a rhetorical framework based on a less
retributive idea of justice and a more central focus on pacification and memorialization (Aylwin,
March 4, 1991). However, further analysis is required to fully understand the way rhetoric was
used in Chile to frame transitional democracy and transitional justice.
The purpose of this analysis was to demonstrate that particular patterns of rhetoric during
the period of democratic transition and transitional justice in Argentina established norms of
democracy and human rights in different and significant ways. This analysis also sought to
demonstrate how tracing patterns in rhetorical usage—or “rhetorical carbon dating”—from the
transitional period to the present demonstrates how norms ratified during the crucial period of
transition have long lasting impacts on how those norms continue to be produced and reproduced
well after consolidation. This thesis also sought to demonstrate the value of rhetorical analysis to
demonstrate lasting trends in ideology and political action regarding certain principles that are

25

1990, a full seven years after Argentina began its transition.
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critical during a period of transition from repressive authoritarianism to human rights respecting
democracy.
There are many layers of importance to this research. From a methodological standpoint,
it demonstrates the importance of rhetoric and rhetorical analysis in various realms of political
science. While much of political science interprets rhetoric as a byproduct of other political
processes, this research aims to demonstrate how rhetoric alone can act as an explanatory
variable for multitudes of political actions. At a more particular level, this thesis demonstrates
the significant importance of rhetoric during the period of regime transition. During the period of
democratic transition, especially when occurring in tandem with various transitional justice
processes, the way certain principles are conceptualized reflects on what the new regime stands
for, what it rejects from its past, and what it intends to uphold going forward. Considering the
implications on democracy and human rights, such information can alter the way a transitional
regime takes its first steps towards eventual consolidation.
This analysis also seeks to provide hope and alternatives beyond the limits of institutional
strength, military threat, and economic viability for a transitioning regime. While much of the
previous literature on the topic of transitional democracy and transitional justice have asserted
the central value of institutional strength in evaluating a society’s long term adherence to
principles of democracy and human rights. Suggesting the importance of rhetoric offers an
uplifting alternative to this model. Rather than focusing on how lack of funds, presence of a
military threat, or most importantly, institutional weakness may threaten a fledgling regime’s
ability to establish norms of democracy and human rights, the rhetoric-centric model argues that
as long as the transitional regime establishes discursive norms in government and society, the
crucial understandings of human rights and democracy can last. This lessens the risk of rushing
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certain transitional democracy and transitional justice mechanisms in an effort to do as much as
possible before the “transitional window” is closed.
Furthermore, by moving away from traditional measurements of institutional strength and
instead focusing on rhetorical patterns, transitional justice and transitional democracy theory can
be more reflective of reality and represent the dynamism inherent to human rights. By turning to
Latin America and other regions with histories of recent transition and analyzing how they view
democracy and human rights in the wake of recent regime transitions, there is more room
academically and politically for competing notions of democracy, rights, justice, truth, and
reconciliation.
Areas for further research include diving into the role that civil society and the media
play in producing and reproducing norms of democracy and human rights. The Southern Cone
and Argentina in particular are excellent examples of how the demands and conceptualizations of
civil society, and in particular human rights groups, are able to affect policy outcomes regarding
principles of human rights and democracy. In particular, looking at the way in which civil
society and the democratic government interact to continually reshape and redefine these
principles together is a significant point that could contribute much to research on the long term
implications of transitional periods.
From a transnational perspective, further research could also illuminate the effects of
translating rhetoric from one language to another. This could be analyzed directly between
languages within a region (i.e. from Latin American Spanish to Brazilian Portuguese), or across
multiple languages (i.e. Latin American Spanish to Brazilian Portuguese to American English).
As principles of human rights and democracy become more globalized, it would be of
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considerable importance to see how losing certain discursive elements in translation may affect
how they are transnationally conceptualized.
In conclusion, rhetorical and discursive analysis has much to offer political science,
especially insofar as tracing the impacts of certain interpretations and understandings of the way
ideas are transferred and reified over time. As ideologies of human rights and democratic
governance become more and more transnationalized, the importance of analyzing the
construction and maintenance of these ideas becomes ever more significant.
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